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ABSTRACT
This Article sets out the first comprehensive analytical framework
for non-activist shareholder cooperation, showing that coordinated
engagement by non-activist institutions can be a promising lever by
which tofoster a more effective and viable corporate governance role
for non-activist institutional investors and provide an alternative to
activist-driven ownership involvement.
After considering the diverging incentives structures of activist and
non-activist investors and showing how they are reshaped in a context
where investors collaborate in the engagement process, this Article
shows how non-activist driven collective engagements are beneficial
in several respects. Specifically, collective engagements favor the
redistribution of engagement costs and, therefore, increase the net
return earned by each institutional investor involved. In doing so, they
also lower thefree-riderproblem, which generally affects institutional
shareholders'behavior. Moreover, thepresence ofa third-party entity
coordinating the engagement initiatives can work as an effective tool
for reducing potential regulatory risks, mainly concerning 13D group
disclosures and Regulation FD.
Against this background, this Article concludes that, in order to
promote non-activist collective engagement initiatives, there is the
need for the SEC to provide greater clarity concerning the
circumstances under which engaging collectively through an enabling
organization will not, as a rule, be regarded as control-seeking or
acting in concert, and will not trigger group filing obligations under
Section 13 of the Securities and Exchange Act. In addition, the SEC
should explicitly recognize the role ofsuch coordinating entities--that
adopt predefined frameworks governing the process of engagement
and establish rules of conduct for participating investors-in
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promoting collective engagement initiatives in line with the applicable
regulatoryframework.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a world where the agency ownership model of publicly traded
shares is largely predominant and the ownership of publicly listed
corporations is increasingly institutionalized, active institutional
shareholders are considered key to firms' corporate governance. The
case for institutional oversight is that "product, capital, labor, and
corporate control market constraints on managerial discretion are
imperfect, corporate managers need to be watched by someone, and
the institutions are the only watchers available."' From the public
policy standpoint, institutional investors' active ownership is believed
to serve the efficient allocation of capital to the most promising
business ventures as well as informed corporate monitoring, so as to
ensure that the best possible use is made of the capital provided.2
Ownership engagement by institutions is therefore regarded as
essential to value creation, economic growth, and the fostering of a
well-functioning market economy.3
Since the late 1980s, many have viewed institutional investors as
the potential sharp-eyed natural champions of corporate monitoring
and stewardship.' Institutions holding large blocks, more power and
greater access to company information, along with the requisite skills,
behave differently-so it is argued-from dispersed individual
investors and play a more active corporate governance role. They
reduce agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and
control and ultimately promote shareholder welfare. It is then asserted
that institutional shareholders monitor investments by voting and
engaging informally through dialogue with portfolio companies and
' Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise ofInstitutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 815 (1992).
2 See Serdar gelik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and Ownership
Engagement, 2013/2 OECD J.: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 93,104 (2014).
3 Id. See also ICGN Global Stewardship Principles, INT'L CORP. Gov. NETWORK 1,
5(2016),
https://www.icgn.org/sites/default/files/ICGNGlobalStewardshipPrinciples.pdf
[hereinafter ICGN GSP] (conceiving of stewardship as part of a responsible
investment approach owed by money managers to end-investors, aimed at
preserving and enhancing long-term value and "overall financial market stability
and economic growth").
4 See, e.g., Black, supra note 1; See generally, Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agendafor Institutional
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991).
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support enhanced directors' accountability; when needed, they
leverage formal shareholder ights and run campaigns to challenge the
board's authority.
By the end of the 1990s, however, supporters of institutional active
ownership had to acknowledge that only a small number of U.S.
institutional investors, mostly public pension plans, were actually
active shareholders, and that institutions' spending on governance
efforts was very limited. Moreover, empirical evidence seemed not to
convincingly support any relationship between activism and company
performance. 6 Overall, shareholder activism, conceived of "as
proactive efforts to change firm behavior or governance rules,"
proved to be quite limited, and the skeptical view of the institutional
investor as the shareholders' champion appeared to be justified. 8
Simply put, monitoring costs were considered likely to outweigh the
potential benefits of playing an active role. 9 Collective action
problems arising out of institutions' fractional ownership combined
with regulatory impediments to communication with fellow
shareholders were disincentivizing shareholders' joint action. The
resulting mismatch between private cost-bearing and collective gain-
sharing with free-riding passive investors frustrated the possibility of
then playing an active role in corporate governance. 10 Some
institutions' pro-manager conflicts of interest, as well as shareholder-
unfriendly corporate law rules which generally favored entrenched
boards, also contributed to passivity. 'Overall, with rare exceptions,
institutions appeared to be as rationally apathetic as individual
shareholders.12
s Bernard S. Black, ShareholderActivism and Corporate Governance in the United




8See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance ofInstitutional
ShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991).
9See Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1009 (1994).
0 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors 12-
14 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 05-20),
https:/ssrn.com/abstract-796227.
" See Black, supra note 1, at 822-827 (referring (i) to the cumulative chilling effect
of blockholder filing requirements under section 13(d) of the Securities and
Exchange Act and related SEC rules, company poison pills, the SEC's proxy rules
and the shareholder proposal 14a-8 Rule, and (ii) to bank and insurers' extensive
dealings with corporate managers, managerial control over corporate pension
funds, and public pensions funds' responsiveness to political pressure).
12 See Bainbridge, supra note 10.
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Since then, however, the features of shareholder activism have
evolved and forces capable of overcoming such disincentives have
arisen. First, pension funds and other categories of traditional
institutions have increasingly left space for alternative institutional
investors, such as private equity firms and, particularly, hedge funds
with more significant equity positions in a limited number of
individual companies and strong incentives for proactive, strategic
governance and performance intervention.13 Starting from the second
half of the 2000s, hedge funds have grown into prominent players in
corporate monitoring and have boosted shareholder activism at an
unprecedented rate.14
Second, although it attracted much less attention than the rise of
hedge funds, both practitioners and scholarsf still a limited
number-point to shareholder collective initiatives as another means
by which to voice concerns about corporate governance and
performance in a more effective and cost-saving manner.
Where individual blockholdings are small, weight matters. This
means that collective action can obviously be far more convincing than
independent conduct in pressuring the board of directors, holding the
management accountable and assembling non-trivial voting power.15
In addition, shareholder collective engagement initiatives can help to
" See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution ofShareholder Activism in
the United States, 19 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 55, 55 (2007); Harwell Wells, A
Long View ofShareholder Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the
Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REv. 1033, 1097 (2015); William W. Bratton &
Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction to Institutional Investor Activism: Hedge Funds
and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation, U. PENN. INST. FOR L. & ECON.
RES. PAPER No. 16-12, 2015, at 2, https://ssrn.com/ abstract-2785587.
4 See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund
Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 682-684 (2007).
1 See, e.g. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals
and Shareholder Activism: The Role ofInstitutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. EcoN.
275, 276 and 303 (2000) (finding that shareholder proposals sponsored by
coordinated groups-investor associations or investment groups-were able to
garner substantially more voting support than proposals sponsored by individuals);
Tim C. Opler & Jonathan Sokobin, Does Coordinated Institutional Activism Work?
An Analysis of the Activities of the Council ofInstitutional Investors 5 (Dice Center
for Res. in Fin. Econ., Working Papers Series 95-5, 1995),
https://ssm.com/abstract=46880 (showing that coordinated engagements facilitated
by the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) positively impact target firms'
performance, "consistent with the view that coordinated monitoring and 'quiet'
governance activism by institutional investors is effective").See also Bernard S.
Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 523-24 (1990)
(however highlighting legal obstacles to shareholder coordination).
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share costs, overcome collective action problems and alleviate
regulatory risks. 16
Against this backdrop, the form of coordinated intervention that has
possibly received most consideration from corporate governance
scholars and practitioners, and even lawmakers, is that of so-called
wolf packs formed by like-minded activist hedge funds with the aim
of bringing about significant corporate changes in targeted
companies.17
One further form of shareholder cooperation frequently in the
spotlight involves non-activist institutions teaming up with activist
shareholders, mostly following support-seeking publicity via the press.
Hedge funds that act as specialized "governance intermediaries" by
monitoring company performance and actively submitting proposals
for business strategy have proven to be a powerful driver for activating
the reactive response from mainstream non-activist institutions:
"activists gain their power not because of their equity stakes, which
are not controlling, but because of their capacity to present convincing
plans to institutional shareholders, who ultimately will decide whether
the activists' proposed plan should be followed." 8
However, these are not the examples of shareholder coordinationto
which this Article seeks to draw attention. In order to fill a gap within
the existing legal scholarship, drawing on empirical and anecdotal
evidence of the relevance of such an alternative shareholder
cooperation model that does not mean to achieve or influence
corporate control, 19 we analyze a non-activist-driven approach to
collective engagement, which is based on the coordination function
performed by a third-party enabling entity.2 0
Over the last few years, representative organizations, such as the
Council of Institutional Investors in the U.S., to some extent, and even
more so the Institutional Investors' Forum in the UK, Eumedion in the
Netherlands, Assogestioni in Italy, and many more have emerged as a
cost-saving and efficient tool for supporting institutions' active
stewardship collectively and "mak[ing] the case for long-term
16 See infra Part IV.C.
' See infra part IV.A.
18Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism.
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
863, 867 (2013).
19 See infra, Part IV.C.1.
20 See infra, Part II.C.
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investment approaches."21 Organizations that provide affiliate
institutions with corporate governance services and actively lobby to
consolidate investors' votes and encourage dialogue with corporations
have proven to be effective in stimulating the collective involvement
of institutional shareholders with investee companies despite their
weak individual incentives and the free-rider disincentive. Since the
engagement strategies, programs and agendas promoted are chiefly
based on the constructive discussion of key issues with portfolio
companies in order to convey investors' shared views without asking
for significant corporate changes nor intervening in the details of the
management decision-making, the coordinating organizations
typically adopt a non-confrontational and collaborative stance.
Institutional investor organizations are a collective monitoring tool
aimed at minimizing institutions' stewardship costs, hence reducing
corporate agency costs and enhancing the collective voice of investors.
Thus, coordinating organizations promote an institutional investor-
driven model of non-activist, relationship-building corporate
monitoring and oversight that is fundamentally different from that
adopted by activist hedge funds and wolf packs.2 2
The importance of promoting the corporate governance role of
coordinated non-activist shareholders is further underscored when the
re-concentration of U.S. corporate ownership and the concentration of
the asset management industry is taken into account. There is little
doubt, in fact, that corporate ownership, asset and asset industry
concentration render institutions' stewardship inescapable. This is
even more so the case if it is considered that, over time, the increases
in both institutional ownership and ownership concentration have
prompted regulatory action aimed at enhancing institutions'
"responsibilities" in performing the corporate governance functions
associated with share ownership. 23 Furthermore, the promotion of
cost-effective pathways for institutions' collective monitoring can also
help to activate passively managed funds with particularly weak
financial incentives for being active and attentive owners, and to
21 FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY & FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, Building a Regulatory




22 See generally Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 186
(2015).
23 See infra Part M.A.3.
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counteract the potential for "unthinking and automated approach to
governance that is unlikely to be in the company's best interest."2 4
Against this backdrop, this Article seeks to provide a
comprehensive analytical framework for non-activist shareholder
cooperation by extending the perspective for analysis beyond hedge-
fund wolf packs and activist-driven teaming up. It aims to demonstrate
that coordinated engagement by non-activist institutions can be a
promising lever by which to foster a more convincing and viable
corporate governance role for non-activist institutional investors and
provide an alternative to activist-driven ownership involvement.
With a view to illustrating how collective engagement can be key
in making non-activist institutional investor stewardship more
effective and provide an actual alternative to hedge fund-driven
activism, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets the scene by
drawing some relevant distinctions. In order to examine the issue of
collaboration between non-activist institutions, it is first necessary to
draw a clear distinction between activist and non-activist shareholders,
as well as the non-overlapping notions of activism and engagement.
Based on these distinctions, Part III examines the diverging incentive
structures underlying activist and non-activist investors' ownership
within a context of solo-engagement. Part IV reconsiders those
incentive structures in a context where investors collaborate in the
engagement process. First, we provide an overview of the different
types of shareholder coordination that take place in the practice.
Taking account of the recommendations made by a growing body of
soft regulation-chiefly stewardship codes and principles-we
highlight the distinction between activist-driven and non-activist-
driven forms of shareholder collaboration. Second, we contend that
hedge fund wolf packs and the activist-driven receptive teaming up
phenomenon need to be kept distinct from the non-activist collective
engagements that are recommended by the stewardship principles
adopted in several countries.25 This is because these forms of
shareholder collaboration substantially differ in terms of the potential
advantages and disadvantages of their operation. We then analyze the
potential benefits of collective engagements and how they can
stimulate institutions' active ownership. Part V examines the
regulatory framework applicable to the various types of shareholder
collaboration, showing that they need to be kept separate also from the
24 See Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J.
CORP. L. 493, 510 (2018).
25 See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of
International Stewardship Codes, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497 (2018).
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regulatory standpoint. Crucially, we contend that, if collective
engagement is to be incentivized to promote non-activist stewardship
as an actual alternative to activist-driven share ownership, it is
necessary to clarify the grey areas still remaining within the relevant
regulatory framework. In particular, regulators should acknowledge
the facilitating role played by third-party coordinating entities and
provide greater clarity concerning the circumstances in which
collective engagement through an.enabling organization will not, as a
rule, be regarded as control-seeking or concerted action and will not
trigger group filing requirements under Section 13 of the Securities
and Exchange Act. Part VI concludes.
II. SETTING THE SCENE
Before examining institutional shareholder collaboration and its
role in corporate governance, it is first necessary to set the conceptual
framework and the definitions that are relevant for the purposes of this
Article. Within the debate on shareholder activism, the very notion of
activism is usually used to refer to any kind of ownership engagement
by institutional investors, irrespective of its specific character or
degree, which may vary, and investor characteristics. However, there
are significant differences between being, or not being, an active
shareholder, which mainly depend on the business model of the
relevant investor. Thus, the undifferentiated use of the term "activism"
may be misleading. Accordingly, some distinctions must be drawn for
the purposes of the following analysis.
A. Activist vs Non-Activist Institutional Investors
As early as 1994, Briggs clearly stated his position concerning the
concept of shareholder activism, noting that "[a]ctive investors ... are
not "typical" institutional investors." 26 The latter were, in fact,
essentially passive shareholders. Briggs drew the attention to "several
kinds of private investment funds commonly known as hedge, risk
arbitrage, value investment or vulture funds" for whom "'activism'
does not mean putting a resolution on management's proxy card asking
shareholders to vote to end discriminatory employment practices or
redeem a poison pill. For these investors, activism means securing
board representation with a view to fundamentally changing a
26 Thomas W. Briggs, Shareholder Activism and Insurgency under the New Proxy
Rules, 50 Bus. L. 99, 147 (1994).
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company's policies, dismissing management or taking over a
company."27
Traditional institutional investors, such as public and private
pension plans, actively managed mutual funds and insurance
companies, could not reasonably be expected to be truly activist
shareholders. Portfolio diversification and fragmentation predicted
that these institutions would be likely to dedicate attention to "process
and structure issues," rather than company-specific concerns.28 They
would not exert day-to-day control over individual investee
companies, and would be even less likely to engage in company-
specific "[micro-management]."29 Institutions would engage with
portfolio companies chiefly concerning general issues such as
antitakeover devices, plurality voting, the composition and structure of
the board of directors, director elections and compensation.3 0
In fact, the issue at the very roots of the large differences in the
quality and quantity of ownership involvement with portfolio
companies is the varying features and choices that define institutional
investors' business models. 31 Qelik and Isaksson identify seven
factors, each of which must be further distinguished based on a set of
options available to the institution, which taken together shape the
institution's business model and determine its likely attitude towards
ownership engagement.32 These factors include: the purpose of the
institution (for profit or not for profit); its liability structure, (whether
or not an institution is under a profit maximizing obligation towards
its owners); the investment strategy (ranging from passive indexing to
active fundamental, up to purely quantitative active strategies); the
portfolio structure (whether concentrated or diversified); the fee
structure (ranging from performance through flat fees, to no fees); and
an institution's possible political or social objectives.3 3 The applicable
regulatory framework also contributes to shaping an institution's
behavior as an owner, depending on whether any requirements, or
limitations, are set as regards to an institution's engagement with
27 Id. at 101-102.
28 Black, supra note 1, at 818; See also Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index
Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders be Shareholders 4-5, 34-35
(N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law Working Paper No. 467/2019, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098 [permalink: https://perma.cc/45TC-G7CC].
29 Black, supra note 1, at 834.
3 01 d. at 818. See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at 35.
3i See Celik & Isaksson, supra note 2, at 93.
32 Id at 105, Table 1.
33 Id. at 105-08.
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investee companies, e.g. voting and voting disclosure requirements, or
voting prohibitions.3 4
Along the same lines, Kahan and Rock attribute the diverging
features of hedge fund and traditional institutions' activism to the
differences between the underlying business models, the resulting
incentive structures and the set of regulatory and political constraints,
as well as conflicts of interests which are largely typical for traditional
institutions.3 5 Also according to Gilson and Gordon, the business
models, and the resulting incentives structures, explain why traditional
institutions usually adopt a passive, or at best a reactive, stance towards
engagement with portfolio companies. 36 Furthermore, Bebchuk,
Cohen and Hirst consider that the structural incentive problem that
negatively affects stewardship by actively managed mutual funds and
index funds with a significant share of the market for managed
investments is likely to undermine the effectiveness of any principle
or guideline put forward by stewardship codes.3 7
Following this line of reasoning, it is clear that engagement remains
a costly endeavor, which cannot easily be aligned with traditional
investors' prevailing business models-which are primarily based on
asset diversification and, as a consequence, portfolio fragmentation-
and the corresponding incentive structures. The inadequate incentives
hypothesis points to a number of factors that characterize the industry
structure as the primary explanation for traditional institutions'
reduced levels of engagement.3 8 These factors include: the highly
competitive structure of the market for money managers, which puts
pressure on lowering costs; rational apathy and the free rider problem;
the institutions' revenue model which, being typically a percentage of
assets under management, encourages increases in funds' size and
complexity; the perverse incentives of asset managers based on a
fund's relative performance, which improves where underweighted
portfolio companies perform badly; the enduring belief that
3 4 Id. at 111, Table 2.
s See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1060-70 (2007).
36 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REv.
863, 867 (2011); Paul H. Edelman, Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson,
Shareholder Voting in an Age ofIntermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REv.
1359, 1408,1415-17 (2014).
" See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. OF ECON.PERSPECTIVES 89, 108 (2017).
38 Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORP. L. & GOVERNANCE 363, 373-74 (Jeffrey N. Gordon
& Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
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involvement in corporate governance reduces resources that could be
better employed in selecting investments in order to increase the fund's
relative performance-and portfolio managers' compensation; and
finally the various conflicts of interests facing asset managers.39
Hence, based on their strongly diverging incentives, activist
shareholders should be kept distinct from non-activist shareholders.
Such a distinction, which draws on investors' natural attitudes towards
share ownership, as shaped by the business model adopted, is useful in
order to explain the determining features and different patterns of
shareholder collaboration and to analyze how they impact the
corporate governance role of institutional investors. For the purposes
of this Article, we shall therefore refer to fundamentally "activist" and
"non-activist" institutions as meaning, respectively, investors with
high incentives for strategic, proactive, and costly, company-specific
governance and performance intervention (as exemplified by
alternative institutions such as activist hedge funds and private equity
funds), and on the other hand investors with weak incentives for
activism other than low-cost engagement, such as most traditional
institutions with active or passive investment strategies.
B. Activism vs Engagement
In keeping with the broadening of the gap between the actual
behavior of activist and non-activist institutional shareholders as
owners, the rise of hedge fund activism has contributed to somehow
shifting the original meaning of the notion of shareholder activism
towards a more strategic and often confrontational kind of governance
and performance engagement. Hedge fund activism typically
embraces "any actual or overtly threatened proxy contest or any other
concerted and direct attempt to change the fundamental strategic
direction of any solvent . .. public corporation other than a mutual
fund." 40 Based on costly fundamental and company-specific analysis,
activists seek specific targets for investment, typically picking the
stocks of underperforming companies, with a view to bringing about a
significant change in corporate governance practices, business plans
and operations, capital structure or strategic direction. In functional
terms, the activist takes up a significant but non-controlling equity
position in the target company and starts to step up pressure-from
persuasion behind the scenes through to proxy contests-to bring
about the particular changes advocated. Activists seek to benefit from
39 I
40 See Briggs, supra note 14, at 695.
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the improved stock price performance returns that usually follow
responsive changes by company management.4 1
By contrast, the promise of traditional non-activist institutional
shareholder initiatives was originally conceived of as lying with voting
and voicing their views, the latter involving primarily informal
shareholder monitoring efforts, as well as, on a residual basis, reacting
to unresponsiveness to investors' demands.4 2 Over the last decade, the
stewardship efforts of traditional institutions have increasingly
focused on dialogue with portfolio companies, which in many cases
occurs privately. A survey of large institutional investors--chiefly
U.S., continental European and UK asset managers, mutual funds and
pension funds-has found that the use of private discussions with
management or members of the board of directors is widespread,
which supports the view that "investors try to engage firms behind the
scenes through direct negotiations, and take public measures (e.g.,
shareholder proposals, public criticism) only if these private
interventions fail." 4 3 In effect, discussions with the management have
been found to be the most frequently used channel for engagement,
followed by voting against the management." Alongside the ability to
voice their views when dissatisfied with a firm's governance,
respondent institutions reported that they also use, on a
complementarily basis, exit, or the threat thereof, as a disciplinary
governance mechanism.4 5 By contrast, the submission of shareholder
proposals as a corporate governance mechanism was reported to be
used far less frequently, as also were the initiation of legal action
against, and the public criticism of, portfolio companies.4 6
In line with the findings that non-activist institutional investors'
preferences focus on dialogue, scholars emphasize that
41 See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of
Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 57 (2011); Bebchuk et
al., supra note 37, at 104-05 (explaining that activists' incentives to spend on
stewardship depend on the likeliness of inducing large governance-generated value
increases); William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO.
L.J. 1375, 1379 (2007).
42 Black, supra note 1, at 817; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at 35; See
Yonca Eritmur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board ofdirectors'
responsiveness toshareholders: Evidencefrom shareholder proposals, 16 J. CORP.
FIN. 53, 58-59 (2010) (referring to shareholder proposals).
43 Joseph A. McCahery, Zacharias Sautner & Laura T. Starks, Behind the Scenes:
The Corporate Governance Preferences ofInstitutional Investors, 71 J. OF FIN.
2905,2912(2016).
4 Id at 2911-13.
45 Id. at 2913, 2918-20.
46 d
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"[i]ncreasingly, the insider-shareholder dynamic in the modem
corporation is collaborative, not competitive," with institutional
investors being at the forefront of such "constructivist" trend offering
"a new source of well-resourced and sophisticated knowledge from
outside the corporation" which complements that of insiders.4 7
According to McCahery et al., institutions' engagement is primarily
triggered by inadequate corporate governance and excessive
compensation, as well as disagreement with long-run strategic
issues-e.g. large diversifying mergers or acquisitions.4 8 On the other
hand, dissatisfaction with company performance does not seem to be
a key driver of shareholder engagement. 49 Hence, mainstream
institutions' ownership engagement is mostly about exerting a
monitoring function and providing portfolio companies with valuable
informational inputs.5 0
Therefore, when compared to situations involving more aggressive
activism in which "hedge funds can often shape a firm's business
policy unilaterally," 5 terms such as shareholder engagement, or, as a
broader category, stewardship-which ave grown popular with the
rise of best practice codes and principles for institutional investors-
appear to be capable of capturing the actual meaning, and the extent,
of non-activist investors' behavior as owners much better than the term
activism. As compared to activism, the milder terms "engagement" and
"stewardship" point towards a kind of active-but non-activist-
ownership the approach of which to portfolio companies is by far less
adversarial, more collaborative, and primarily based on mutual
understanding. At the same time, engagement and stewardship
obviously assume investee companies to be attentive and responsive
to investors' concerns.5 2
Initially, the concepts of engagement and stewardship may perhaps
have been more familiar with the European context, where pioneering
pieces of soft regulation developed and took hold more readily than in
the United States. Those concepts were first established in a systematic
way thanks to the UK Stewardship Code published by the Financial
47 Jill. E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration 3, 5 (Eur. Corp.
Gov. Inst., Working Paper No. 415/2018, 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract-3227113
(emphasis in original).
48 McCahery et al., supra note 43, at 2924.
49 d
'o See Fisch & Sepe, supra note 47, at 14-15.
51 Id. at 11.
52 See, e.g., ICGN GSP, at 22.
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Reporting Council in July 2010. 53 Based on the premises that
responsibility for stewardship of publicly listed companies is shared
between the board, which oversees its management, and investors,
who hold the board accountable for its responsibilities, in its current
version, which took effect from Jan. 1, 2020, the Code explains that
stewardship is more than just voting: "Stewardship activities include
investment decision-making, monitoring assets and service providers,
engaging with issuers and holding them to account on material issues,
collaborating with others, and exercising rights and responsibilities."5 4
The Code makes it clear that effective monitoring is an essential
component of stewardship (Principle 9), and that institutional investors
should escalate their engagement activities (Principle 11).s 1Initial
discussions concerning investors' concerns should take place on a
confidential basis, but if companies do not respond constructively,
then institutional investors should escalate their engagement. As the
previous version of the Code more explicitly explained, institutions
may consider whether, e.g., to hold additional meetings with
management specifically in order to discuss concerns; express
concerns through the company's advisers; meet with the chairman or
other board members; intervene jointly with other institutions on
particular issues; make a public statement in advance of general
meetings; submit resolutions and speak at general meetings; and
requisition a general meeting, in some cases proposing changes to
board membership.56
Similarly, in the Stewardship Code drafted in 2017 by the European
Fund and Asset Management Association (hereinafter, EFAMA)-a
revision of its 2011 Code of External Governance- states that he
concept of stewardship covers the monitoring of, voting the shares of,
and engagement with, investee companies. Stewardship is defined as:
[E]ngagement, i.e. the monitoring of and interaction, with
investee companies, as well as exercising voting rights
5 FIN. REP. COUNCIL, THE LKSTEWARDSHIP CODE(July 2010),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ e223el52-5515-4cdc-a951-
da33e093eb28/UK-Stewardship-Code-July-2010.pdf.
54 FIN. REP.COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2020 (Oct. 2019),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814a-
dl4e156ald87/Stewardship-Code Dec-I9-Final.pdf, at 7 [hereinafter UK
Stewardship Code 2020].
" Id., princ. 9 and 11.
56 FIN. REP. COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE (Sept. 2012),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-
3d24b2f62c5f/UK-Stewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf., princ.4 [hereinafter
UK Stewardship Code 2012].
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attached to shares. Engagement can be on matters such as:
business strategy and its execution; risk management;
environmental and social concerns; corporate governance
issues such as board composition and the election of
independent directors, together with executive remuneration;
compliance, culture and ethics; and performance and capital
structure. Asset managers have a duty to act in the best interests
of their clients as they are entrusted with their money.57
EFAMA Principles are intended to enhance the quality of dialogue
with companies, and "do not constitute an obligation to micro-manage
or intervene in the day-to-day affairs of investee companies or
preclude a decision to sell a holding where that is the most effective
response to such concerns."
Even European legislation has explicitly embraced the concept of
engagement. Directive (EU) 2017/828 of 17 May 2017 amended
Directive 2007/36/EC-the so-called Shareholders' Rights Directive
(hereinafter, SRD )-precisely "as regards the encouragement of
long-term shareholder engagement."59 Based on "clear evidence" of
the inadequacy of the current level of institutional monitoring of, and
engagement with, portfolio companies, and the excessive focus on
short-term returns, the SRD II is aimed at encouraging long-term
shareholder engagement.6 0 According to the SRD LI, "effective and
sustainable shareholder engagement is one of the cornerstones of the
corporate governance model of listed companies."61 Hence, Article
3(g) of the SRD II requires Member States to ensure (on a comply-or-
explain basis) that institutional investors and asset managers "develop
and publicly disclose an engagement policy" describing:
[H]ow they monitor investee companies on relevant matters,
including strategy, financial and non-financial performance
and risk, capital structure, social and environmental impact and
5 EuR. FUND AND ASSET MGMT. Ass'N, STEWARDSHIP CODE. PRINCIPLES FOR
ASSET MANAGERS' MONITORING OF, VOTING IN, ENGAGEMENT WITH INVESTEE
COMPANIES 2 (2018),https://www.efama.org/
Publications/Public/CorporateGovernance/EFAMA%20Stewardship%2OCode.pdf
58 Id at 5.
5 Directive 2017/828 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May
2017 amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-term
Shareholder Engagement, 2017 O.J. (L 132) 1 [hereinafter, SRD 11].
60 See id. at Recitals 2 and 3.
61 See id at Recital 14.
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corporate governance, conduct dialogues with investee
companies, exercise voting rights and other rights attached to
shares, cooperate with other shareholders, communicate with
relevant stakeholders of the investee companies and manage
actual and potential conflicts of interests in relation to their
engagement.6 2
While it is rooted in Europe, in recent years the need for non-activist
institutional investors' engagement has gained momentum also in the
United States, where it is conceived of as the missing middle-ground
approach within the polarized board-versus-shareholder debate, and,
alongside voting, as "another legitimate mechanism for influencing
management and potentially bringing about change." 63 Indeed,
successful engagement can bring about changes at portfolio companies
as "the result of a consensus process."64
The same collaborative tone shapes the relationship between
institutional shareholders and corporations in at least four
different-fairly new-sets of corporate governance and stewardship
principles, as well as similar initiatives, which recommend non-activist
institutional investor engagement in line with the model initially set
out by the UK Stewardship Code.
First, Martin Lipton's "New Paradigm" to corporate governance
provides "a synthesis of the corporate governance codes applicable in
a number of markets and various efforts underway to articulate a new
corporate governance framework." 65 The New Paradigm was
proposed in 2016 under the auspices of the International Business
Council of the World Economic Forum with the aim of achieving
"sustainable long-term investment and growth" and countering short-
termism in managing and investing in businesses. Subsequent updates
provide guidance on the practice of engagement and stewardship,
suggesting, inter alia, that investors "should raise critical issues to
companies as early as possible in a constructive and proactive way,
and seek to engage in a dialogue before submitting a shareholder
62 Id. at Article 3(g) (1)(a).
6 Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, Engagement: The Missing Middle Approach
in the Bebchuck-Strine Debate, 12 NYU J. L. & Bus. 385, 392 (2016). See also
Fisch & Sepe, supra note 47, at 19-20.
' Fisch & Sepe, supra note 47, at 20.
6 See Martin Lipton et al., The New Paradigm. A Roadmapfor an Implicit
Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to
Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth 6 (2016),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttomeyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf.
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proposal. Public battles and proxy contests have real costs and should
be viewed as a last resort where constructive engagement has failed."6 6
Second, the Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance,
drafted by representatives of some of America's largest corporations
and institutional investors, also underscore the importance of a
company's engagement with shareholders and receiving feedback
concerning matters that are relevant to long-term shareholder value,
and recommend that the CEO. should actively engage with corporate
governance and key shareholder issues when meeting with
shareholders.6 7 The Principles also recommend that:
Asset managers should actively engage, as appropriate, based
on the issues, with the management and board of the company,
both to convey the asset manager's point of view and to
understand the company's perspective. Ideally, such
engagement will occur early in the process to facilitate
alignment on resolution of issues where possible and avoid
unnecessary disruption. Asset managers should give due
consideration to the company's rationale for its positions,
including its perspective on certain governance issues where
the company might take a novel or unconventional approach.6 8
Finally, further groups have also adopted analogous self-regulatory
and non-binding initiatives. The Investor Stewardship Group
(hereinafter, ISG) published its Framework for U.S. Stewardship and
Governance, which came into effect in January 2018, recommending
that institutional investors "address and attempt to resolve differences
with companies in a constructive and pragmatic manner." 69 The
Business Roundtable published its Principles of Corporate
Governance in 2016, likewise emphasizing the importance of
constructive engagement with long-term shareholders.70
66 Martin Lipton et al., Some Thoughtsfor Boards ofDirectors in 2019 (Including
The New Paradigm: A Roadmapfor an Implicit Corporate Governance
Partnership Between Corporations andInvestors to Achieve Sustainable Long-
Term Investment and Growth) 18 (2018), http://www.wrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/
WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26288.18.pdf
6 7CommonsensePrinciples of Corporate Governance 2.0, COLUMBIA L. SCH.
MILLSTEIN CTR., https://millstein.law.columbia.edu/content/commonsense-
principles-20 (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
6 See id. at 10.
69 The Principles: Stewardship Principles for Institutional Investors, Stewardship
Principle E, https://isgframework.org/..




III. DIVERGING INCENTIVE STRUCTURES
If the actual behavior of activist and non-activist institutional
shareholders as owners is so radically different, this is largely due to
their diverging incentives structure, which fundamentally contributes
to shaping investors' conduct. Once again, those differing economic
incentives can be illustrated by examining more closely the opposition
between non-activist and activist institutional investors.
A. Non-Activist Institutional Investors
The long-standing collective action and limited benefits problems,
alongside conflicts of interest, 7 1 are the main obstacles to active
ownership by mainstream institutional investors. Nevertheless, as the
conduct of some leading fund managers seems to suggest, reputational
concerns can prompt fund managers to increase their investments in
stewardship and play a more active monitoring role in relation to
investee companies.
1. Collective Action Problems and Limited Benefits
As is known, portfolio diversification only allows investors to take
limited advantage of successful individual stewardship efforts with
investee companies. 72 Since stakes held in individual companies
account for a minimal part of the fund's portfolio and, even more so,
the overall assets managed by the fund manager, the benefits
potentially deriving from active engagement will affect fund
performance in a way that is necessarily very limited.73 By contrast,
engagement-related costs can be fairly high and will not be shared with
fellow passive shareholders, which will nonetheless take advantage of
71 See, e.g., John D. Morley, Too Big to Be Activist, 1 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (May 7, 2019), https://ssm.com/abstract-3225555.
72 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate
Governance: Theory, Evidence, andPolicy 17-19 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. Working
Paper No. 433/2018) (2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3282794; Seegenerally
McCahery et al., supra note 43, at 2921 (2016).
73 See Rock, supra note 38, at 373. See also J.B. Heaton, All You Need is Passive A
Response to Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and DavidoffSolomon (July 7, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209614 (Whether corporate governance improvements
will actually improve the firm's value remains however questionable) (stating that
"corporate governance initiatives have little effect on financial performance").
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the company's improved performance.7 4 Costly to produce as they are,
and subject to a form of "non-rivalrous consumption," "the gains
resulting from institutional activism are a species of public goods."75
Moreover, engagement-related costs cannot be passed on to end-
investors, since investment managers are precluded by regulation from
charging stewardship expenses to their funds, or from tying fees to
increases in the value of their portfolios.76 Hence, sensitivity to the
free-rider problem is high, particularly in contexts where competition
for investor capital is high, as is the case within the asset management
industry, 77 where fund managers compete to attract assets under
management based on performance relative to alternative investment
opportunities.7 8
As specifically regards passive index funds (i.e. index fund and
exchange traded funds-ETFs), some argue that these prefer to free-ride
on stewardship initiatives performed by other (active) fund managers.
Indeed, since index fund portfolios are typically much larger than those
held on average by actively managed mutual funds, "any investment
in improving governance at a single portfolio company will be even
less likely to impact the fund's overall performance."79 Due to the very
low fees that index funds charge, "the increased revenue they
receive-through increased fee revenue-will be only a tiny fraction
of the expected value increase from governance improvements."80 in
addition, governance interventions seem especially costly for index
funds because passively managed funds are not informed traders: they
"do not generate information about firm performance as a byproduct
of [trading] and thus must expend additional resources to identify
underperforming firms and evaluate interventions proposed by other
investors."
81
74See Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs ofShareholder Activism: Evidencefrom a
Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. OF FIN. EcoN., 610-631 (2013) (explaining
stewardship-related expenses escalate proportionately to the measures adopted).
7Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 14.
76 Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 108. But see Simone Alvaro, Marco Maugeri &
Giovanni Strampelli, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance and
Stewardship Codes: Problems and Perspectives 60 (CONSOB Legal Research
Papers No. 19) (2019), https://ssm.com/abstract=3393780; Hannes, supra note 22,
at 201, for an alternative view.
7 7John C. Coates, IV & R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund
Industry: Evidence and Implicationsfor Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 5 (2007).
7 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 89, 98; Black, supra note 5, at 468.
79 Shapiro Lund, supra note 24, at 511; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 72, at 17.
so Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 72, at 17.




However, this line of argumentation is controversial since other
scholars contend that, in order to reduce the comparative advantage
that competing actively managed funds enjoy vis-A-vis passive funds
on account of their ability to trade, passive funds need to exert their
voice to improve the corporate governance and performance of
investee companies and to prevent asset outflow.8 2 Because passive
investors are, by definition, quasi-permanent shareholders that cannot
exit underperforming companies, or adjust their relative weight in their
portfolio, they should naturally be incentivized to monitor managers,
use their votes and further stewardship tools to improve the company's
performance. 8 3Owing to the large size of their portfolios, passive fund
managers can exploit economies of scale deriving from "identifying
governance 'best practices' that are likely to reduce the risk of
underperformance" to be "deployed across a broad range of portfolio
companies," at a relatively low cost.8 4
Evidence concerning how passive investment strategies impact
fund managers' incentives to engage actively with portfolio companies
is ambiguous. Some findings suggest that, where passive institutions
make their voice heard, this is associated with significant corporate
governance improvements. In particular, index fund influence has
been found to support greater board independence, favor the removal
of takeover defenses such as classified boards-and promote more
equal voting rights by opposing dual-class share structures.85
However, findings that a greater proportion of passive investors in the
shareholder base is associated with more value-destroying mergers and
82See Jill E. Fisch et al., The New Titans of Wallstreet: A Theoretical Framework
for Passive Investors, 14-16 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. (ECGI) Law Working Paper No.
414/2018) (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract-3192069; Kahan & Rock, supra note
28, at 26-29. But see Heaton, supra note 73, at 17.
8 See Ian Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON.
111, 113-14 (2016); see also Hortense Bioy et al., MORNINGSTAR,Passive Fund
Providers Take an Active Approach to Investment Stewardship, at 3 (2017),
http://www.momingstar.com/content/
dam/morningstar-corporate/pdfs/Research/ Morningstar-Passive-Active-
Stewardship.pdf See also Nan Qin & Di Wang, Are Passive Investors a Challenge
to Corporate Governance? 3 (2018),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=3148309; see also Zohar
Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law 39 (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst.
Working Paper No. 402, 2018), http://www.ecgi. global/sites/
default/files/workingpapers/documents/finalgoshenhannes.pdf. See also Leo Strine,
Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling
Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, at 478
(2014).
' Fisch et al., supra note 82, at 16-17.
8 Appel et al., supra note 83, at 114.
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acquisitions suggest on the other hand that passive investors are less
likely to monitor managers.86
The free-rider disincentive can not only affect truly passive funds
which mimic a given market index but also so-called "closet index"
funds. Closet index funds adopt formally active investment strategies
for portfolio holdings that, however, more or less duplicate some
defined market benchmark; these are, in other words, funds that
"charge for active management, but deliver investments that mostly
overlap with the holdings of a much cheaper passive index fund." In
fact, for a closet indexer, "a desire to improve relative performance
would provide no incentives to move stewardship decisions toward
optimality for any of the portfolio companies where the company's
weighting in the investment fund's portfolio is approximately equal to
its weight in the index; improving the value of those portfolio
companies would not enhance performance relative to the index."88
At the same time, competitive pressure to improve performance
relative to peers can curb investment in engagement also for actively
managed funds. Indeed, they may rationally prefer to invest in
fundamental analysis of portfolio companies to search for the best-
selling opportunities, rather than to initiate engagement: unlike a
successful engagement effort, a successful trade will produce a private
gain for the fund.89 More generally, unless some specific companies
are overweighed in the fund's portfolio compared to competing funds'
portfolios, or in the index tracked by passive competitors, an actively
managed fund has little incentive to take any active stewardship
initiatives. This is because free-riding peers with comparatively
greater stakes would benefit from the improved value in those
companies more than the active fund.90 Also, "to the extent that funds
86Cornelius Schmidt & Rildiger Fahlenbrach, Do Exogenous Changes in Passive
Institutional Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value?, 124 J. FIN.
EcoN. 285, 298 and 300 (2017).
8 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do Mutual Fund Investors Get What They
Payfor: Securities Law and Closet Index Funds, 11 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 31, 33
(2016).
" Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Are Active Mutual Funds More Active Owners
than Index Funds? HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. Gov. & FIN. REG. (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/03/are-active-mutual-funds-more-active-
owners-than-index-funds/.
" See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 36, at 890.
9 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 98-99 ("the extent to which improving the
value of the corporation would improve fund performance will depend on the
extent to which the corporation is overweight in the portfolio." In fact, "any
increase in the value of the portfolio company will be substantially shared by rival
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depart from an index, but still compete with managers of similar funds,
a fund's relative performance improves when 'underweighted'
companies in their portfolio [relative to the index] perform badly."9 1
2. Cost Issues
Portfolio diversification discourages active ownership in part due
to cost considerations. Identifying relevant corporate governance
pitfalls would require a potentially active owner to closely monitor any
of its portfolio companies. However, portfolio companies are most
often simply too many in numbers to really allow fund managers to
operate such screening effectively. Arguably, due to their limited size,
dedicated in-house stewardship teams built up at major asset managers
are not capable of dedicating the same degree of attention to all
portfolio companies.9 2 Although they are expanding,93 stewardship
teams are still too small even at the leading fund managers. For
example, at Blackrock-the world's largest asset manager-the
stewardship team is made up of around 40 people, who are tasked with
monitoring corporate governance issues at around 17,000 companies
and voting in around 17,000 shareholder meetings each year. 94
Therefore, even for major asset managers' stewardship teams,
"[s]imply voting the shares, without even considering how to vote
them, is an enormous task."95
funds that rack the index at least partly. Indeed, the increase in value of the
portfolio company will worsen the performance of the investment fund relative to
rival funds that are more overweight with respect to the portfolio company. Thus,
even for companies that are overweight within the portfolio of the investment fund
relative to the index, the impact of the desire to improve relative performance
would be diluted by the presence of the company in the benchmark index and in the
portfolios of rival funds."). See also McCahery et al., supra note 43, at 2915-16.
9 Rock, supra note 38, at 370.
92 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 98-99. See also Shapiro Lund, supra note
24, at 516.
1Bioy et al., supra note 83 (for instance, in 2018 Vanguard created a new
European stewardship team to include at least five members). See also Chris Flood,
Vanguard Creates New European Stewardship Team, FIN. TIMES(Feb. 18, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/5dbd7d56-1256-11e8-940e-08320fc2a277.
94 Blackrock, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP: PROTECTING OUR CLIENTS'ASSETS FOR
THELONG-TERM 5, 13, and 17 (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-profile-of-
blackrock-investment-stewardship-team-work.pdf.
9 Rock, supra note 38, at 370. See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 100; See
generally Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 72, at 31-34. See also Asaf Eckstein, Great
Expectations: The Peril ofan Expectations Gap in Proxy Advisory Firm
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As a consequence, stewardship teams most often draw up nearly
identical voting guidelines, which they normally tend to follow
closely.96 These voting patterns may also be a consequence of the fact
that asset managers largely rely on proxy advisory firms which adopt
standardized in-house voting policies, or assist clients in drafting their
voting policies, in both instances according to mainstream corporate
governance principles and practices.9 7 True, institutions do not seem
to follow proxy advisors' voting recommendations blindly at all times,
and this is the case especially at larger institutions with in-house
stewardship teams and stronger reputational incentives to be active.9 8
Nevertheless, adhering to a low-cost box-ticking approach to voting is
consistent with the need to keep fees low.99
This is especially so for passive index fund managers. As they
charge very low fees and can, therefore, capture only a tiny fraction of
the expected revenues originated by stewardship initiatives,
stewardship-related costs have a significant impact on passive funds'
fee structure.o00 As one of us has already noted, this prediction seems
to be confirmed by available data and evidence suggesting that passive
Regulation, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 93 (2015); John C. Coates, IV, The Future of
Corporate Governance Part I The Problem of Twelve, 14 (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://ssm.com/abstract=3247337.
96 See VANGUARD, VANGUARD'S PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES,
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/policies-and-guidelines/#
("[T]he guidelines ... provide a rigorous framework for assessing each proposal...
each proposal must be evaluated on its merits, based on the particular facts and
circumstances as presented."). See also STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS, ANNUAL
STEWARDSHIP REPORT 2017 YEAR END 12 (2018),
https://www.ssga.com/investmenttopics/environmental-social-
govemance/2018/07/annual-stewardship-report-2017.pdf (declaring that State
Street adheres strictly to adopted voting policy and all its voting and engagement
activities are centralized within the asset stewardship team irrespective of
investment strategy or geographic region).
97 See JAMES R. COPLAND, DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, THE BIG THUMB
ON THE SCALE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROXYADVISORY INDUSTRY 7-8 (Rock Ctr. for
Corp. Governance at Stan. U. Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies
in Corporate Governance No. CGRP-72; Stan. U. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research
Paper No. 18-27) (2018), https://ssm.com/abstract-3188174.
"See Rock, supra note 38, at 370-71.
" See Shapiro Lund, supra note 24, at 495 (noting that passive investors tend to
approve any shareholder proposal that meets pre-determined qualifications). See
also Rana Foroohar, Investors Pass the Buck on Governance, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 29,
2017),https://www.ft.com/content/f251Od5a-b961-11e7-8cl2-5661783e5589; -
Attracta Mooney & Robin Wigglesworth, Passive Fund Managers Face Showdown
in US Gun Debate, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/517fbbb6-1d4c-11e8-956a-43db76e69936.
'10 See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 72, at 18-19.
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index funds can have a positive impact on corporate governance issues
for which low-cost interventions are required, such as voting according
to pre-defied policies at.annual meetings.o10 By contrast, passive
investors are deemed to. be generally passive owners "when it comes
to high-cost governance activities such as monitoring of M&A, the
choice of board members, or the accumulation of titles that often
happen outside of annual general meetings and require continuous
monitoring." 02
3. Reputational Incentives
While collective action and cost issues can significantly discourage
non-activist institutional investors from engaging with investee
companies, especially when engagement comes with higher costs,
there is growing reputational and regulatory pressure for leading fund
managers-mainly the largest passive fund managers'03-to be active
monitors.1 04
First, reputational concerns that leading fund managers should play
an active monitoring role are fueled by regulatory pressure to exercise
voting rights in keeping with mutual fund fiduciary duties to end-
investors. 1 The SEC has adopted a disclosure-based regulatory
strategy that has prompted (albeit without imposing a duty)
institutional investors to vote all portfolio shares.106 Second, it is also
101 Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate
Governance Consequences ofPassive Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 803, 823
(2018).
102 Schmidt & Fahlenbach, supra note 86, at 287.
103 See infra, notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
" Bioy et al., supra note 83, at 3; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at 32.
105 See MORNINGSTAR, PASSIVE FUND PROVIDERS TAKE AN ACTIVE APPROACH TO
INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP 3 (2017),
http://www.momingstar.com/content/dam/morningstar-
corporate/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-Passive-Active-Stewardship.pdf; Fisch et. al.,
supra note 82, at 30.
" Voting by mutual and public pension funds was fueled by regulatory action
taken to enhance fiduciary obligations applicable to voting proxies. See SEC. &
EXCH. COMM'N, DISCLOSURE OF PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROXY VOTING
RECORDS BY REGISTERED MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES, 68 Fed. Reg.
6564 (Feb. 7, 2003); SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PROXY VOTING BY INVESTMENT
ADVISERS, 68 Fed. Reg. 6586 (Feb. 7, 2003). This voting was also fueled by
Department of Labor interpretative guidelines concerning the standards under
sections 402, 403 and 404 of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act. See SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, INTERPRETATIVE BULLETIN RELATING TO
WRITTEN STATEMENTS OF INVESTMENT POLICY, INCLUDING PROXY VOTING POLICY
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credible that creating the appearance of governance expertise will help
funds managers to win over clients, especially among institutional
investors.107 Moreover, fund managers may see corporate engagement
"as a branding or marketing tool that provides them. with another
dimension on which to compete for assets."108
In line with the underlying assumption that the three leading passive
fund managers "are simply too-big-to-be-passive,"109 the conduct of
OR GUIDELINES, 59 Fed. Reg. 38.863 (July 29,1994) (29 CFR 2509.94-2). Those
rulings were largely (mis-)interpreted as requiring addressees to vote every proxy.
See e.g. Rock, supra note 38, at 374-78; Shaprio Lund, supra note 24, at 526-29.
Further SEC material explicitly recognized that votes based upon the
recommendations of an independent hird party can serve investment advisers to
fulfill their fiduciary obligation under Rule 206(4)-6, and was further interpreted as
requesting investment advisers to vote on all matters. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n
No-Action Letter to Egan-Jones Proxy Services (May 27, 2004),
https://web.archive.org/web/20041105044340/
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/egan052
7 04 .htm; No Action
Letter to Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (Sept. 15, 2004),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/iss0
9 1504.htm. In order to
tackle these unintended consequences, in 2014, the SEC Divisions of Corporate
Finance and Investment Management released new guidance regarding the
responsibilities of investment advisers concerning proxy voting. See SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, STAFF LEGAL BULLETINNo. 20 (IM/CF), PROXY VOTING: PROXY VOTING
RESPONSIBILITIES OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND AVAILABILITY OF EXEMPTIONS
FROM THE PROXY RULES FOR PROXY ADVISORY FIRMS (June 30, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb20.htm#_ftn1. Similarly, the Department of
Labor revised its guidance in 2008 and 2016. See Interpretative Bulletin Relating to
the Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 73 Fed. Reg. 61.732 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (clarifying that proxies should be voted as part of
the process of managing the plan's investment in company stock unless the time
and costs associated with voting proxies in respect to certain types of proposals or
issuers may not be in the plan's best interest). Interpretive Bulletin 2008-2 was later
withdrawn and replaced by Interpretive Bulletin 2016-1, which reinstates the
language of Interpretive Bulletin 94-2 with certain modifications. See Interpretative
Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights, 81 Fed. Reg. 95.879 (Dec.
29, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509).
107 Shapiro Lund, supra note 24, at 527; see also Jennifer Thompson, Pensionfunds
raise concern over index manager stewardship, FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/f75459e3-3a6d-383e-843b-6c7141e8442e (noting that
"[a]t a time of fierce competition between passive managers .. . the quality of
stewardship will become a way for them to stand out").
10Fisch et al., supra note 82, at 13; Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at 30-31.
1
09Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A
Network Theory Perspective 14 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No.
393/2018), at 14-15 (2018),
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/workingpapers/documents/finalenriquesroma
no.pdf; See also John Gapper, Indexfund managers are too bigfor comfort, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ad8c8al2-fd5f-11e8-aebf-
99e208d3e521.
159
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
the Big Three appears to confirm this prediction. Indeed, they
frequently reiterate that they participate in the governance of investee
companies, e.g. in open letters sent to the CEOs of the world's largest
companies.11oAs Kahan and Rock note, leading passive investors
"have strong reputational interests to be perceived, by investors,
regulators, and politicians, as responsible actors who are a force for the
good." 1 In addition, the considerable attention paid by some leading
institutional investors to ESG matters could help to attract clients that
are especially attentive to socially responsible investing.1 12
B. Activist Institutional Investors
Unlike traditional institutions, activist investors, and especially
hedge funds, conceive of activism not as a tool for remedying a
particular corporate flaw (according to an ex post perspective), but
rather as a strategic ex ante lever by which to increase returns on
investment. As Kahan and Rock summarized, activism by traditional
institutions is aimed at achieving small, systemic changes, entails low
costs, and is incidental and ex post.113 On the contrary, hedge fund
activism aims at achieving significant changes at individual
companies, entails higher costs, and is strategic and ex ante, in that
"[a]ctivists first identify a problematic company, then decide whether
intervention can improve matters. If activists conclude that an
intervention is warranted, they buy a stake in order to intervene."1 4
Hedge funds' usual investment strategies and the applicable regulatory
regime are such that they weaken some of the disincentives that reduce
"o See LARRY FINKS'S ANNUAL LETTER TO CEOs. A SENSE OF PURPOSE,
https://www.BlackRock.com/ corporate/investor-relations/larry-fmk-ceo-letter (last
visited, Feb. 19, 2019) (stating that, in.managing its index funds, "BlackRock
cannot express its disapproval by selling the company's securities as long as that
company remains in the relevant index. As a result, our responsibility to engage
and vote is more important than ever."). For similar remarks on the part of State
Street CEO seeCYRuS TARAPOREVALA, State Street's letter to board members
2019, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 4,2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019 /02/04/state-street-and-corporate-culture-
engagement/.
."Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at 28.
1l 2 Id. at 30-31.
11 3Kahan & Rock, supra note 35, at 1043-44, 1069. See also Alvaro et al., supra
note 76, at 38-39.
14 Rock, supra note 38, at 382. See also Cheffins & Armour, supra note 41, at 56-
58 (defining mainstream institutional investors' activism as "defensive" in nature,
as opposed to hedge funds' "offensive" activism, the former relying on pre-existing
stakes in the company and the latter being based upon ad ho stake-building).
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the readiness of mainstream institutional investors to engage with
portfolio companies.
1. Portfolio Concentration and "Two Twenty-Like"Rules
Hedge fundscan hold under-diversified portfolios since they are
exclusively intended for professional investors and, therefore, are not
subject to the prudential regulatory framework which typically applies
to mutual funds and other categories of traditional institutions in order
to protect unskilled end-investors. 115 Higher levels of portfolio
concentration allow hedge funds to be committed to more actively
engaging with investee companies as compared with traditional
diversified institutions since, by holding higher stakes, they can reap
higher benefits associated with improved corporate performance
following successful intervention. First, improvements in a single
target's performance have a greater effect on the fund's overall returns
than is the case for diversified portfolios. 116 Second, portfolio
concentration reduces the likeliness that the activist may be faced with
free-riding from competitors that hold a position in the same
company.117 Third, portfolio concentration allows greater resources to
be dedicated to the monitoring of, and engagement with, individual
investee companies."8
Hedge funds' fee structures also provide a strong incentive towards
active engagement as well. In fact, despite criticism, "two twenty-like"
fund manager compensation structures are widespread in the hedge
fund industry, where "[t]he 'two' refers to an annual management fee
of two percent of the capital that investors have committed to the fund.
The 'twenty' refers to a twenty percent share of the future profits of
the fund."l9 The upside potential of performance fees, which are now
11See generally WulfA. Kaal & Dale A. Oesterle, The History ofHedge Fund
Regulation in the United States, HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS, OXFORD U. PRESS
(2016).
116 Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 105.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (2008). But see Robin Wigglesworth, DE Shaw to
revert to '3 and 30'model as cost pressures bite, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019, 6:24
AM), https://www.ft.com/contentfe2799b4-6252-11e9-b285-3acd5d43599e
(noting that "only 3 per cent now charge a 2 per cent management fee, and 16 per
cent take a fifth of profits .. .The average is now just 1.45 per cent and 16.9 per
cent respectively"). Although, due to growing pressure from low- or zero-fee
passive funds and to performance not always adequate, two-and-twenty rules
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usually charged on profits above the hurdle performance levels that the
fund manager has agreed to with the investor, provides a potent
financial incentive for activism, since "[i]f the fund does well, the
managers share in the treasure. If the fund does badly, however, the
manager can walk away."1 20 Capturing twenty percent of the value
increase of the position in the target is "an order of magnitude more
than the percentage of any value increase that a mutual fund manager
would be able to capture." 21
2. The Absence ofBusiness Ties with.Investee Companies
Unlike non-activist institutions, most hedge funds do not sell
money management services to portfolio companies or, more
generally, have no business ties with the public corporations in which
they invest, and do not hold horizontal shareholdings in a vast number
of issuers.122 Hence, they are less subject to the conflicts of interest
that are associated with the desire to attract business from investee
companies and, as a consequence, with bias toward non-adversarial, if
not overtly manager-friendly, ownership behavior. 123 As Morley
notes, normally activist hedge funds are not run by large investment
managers - e.g. BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity- since these
managers are simply too big to be activists.124 Specifically, since the
largest investment managers run different business lines, an activist
initiative promoted by one of their fund managers could harm the
clients of other funds managed by the same investment
conglomerate.125
appear to be declining; hedge funds' fee models still remain expensive, with
average management fees of around 1.5 per cent and performance fees rarely lower
than 15 per cent. See Chris Flood, Hedgefundfee model morphsfrom 'two and 20'
to 'one or 30', FIN. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2019) at 16,
https://www.ft.com/content/7e4e2cdc-8c2a-34d4-a7e2-6Oc9db9e2a2d (citing
Institutional Investors Survey, JP MORGAN CHASE& CO. 11 (2019),
https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320747018387.pdf).
120 Fleischer, supra note 119, at 1. See also Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 104;
Rock, supra note 38, at 382.
121 Bebchuk et al., supra note 3741, at 104.
122 See Rock, supra note 38, at 382.
123 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 105-06; Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 72, at
22-25.
124 Morley, supra note 71, at 1.
1 25 id
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3. The Corporate Governance Limits ofHedge Fund Activism
However, hedge fund activism also suffers from limitations that
can weaken its potentially beneficial corporate-governance effects.
First of all, activist intervention mostly occurs in relation to
underperforming targets, which means that intervention is worth the
costs in terms of the expected returns.12 6 Therefore, companies that do
not match activists' stock picking will not usually become involved in
any of the corporate changes on the activist's usual playbook.127
Second, and more broadly, there is still a question as to whether the
effects of hedge fund activism are actually positive or negative. Those
who view activists as valuable corporate monitors that can benefit all
shareholders underscore the fact that no evidence has been found to
suggest that activist intervention, including investment-limiting and
adversarial intervention, is followed by any short-term gains in
performance at the price of long-term performance.1 28 Supporters of
hedge fund activism further highlight the fact that operating
performance increases at targeted firms;12 9 and that innovation output
(as measured by patent counts and citations) also increases. 130
Moreover, activism is claimed to induce industry peers that are not
targeted to respond proactively to the threat of possible activist
intervention by implementing policy changes that mimic those made
by targeted firms.13 1 Finally, it is asserted that activist investment-
limiting proposals effectively curb the management's bias towards
inefficient expansion and empire building.13 2
However, further evidence supports the view "that the substantial
private gains hedge funds realize through activism come at the expense
12 6Bebchuk et al., supra note 37, at 106.
127 See Strampelli, supra note 101, at 839.
128 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Bray & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge FundActivism, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1085,1085 (2015).
129 See Matthew R. Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria B. McWilliams, Thirty
Years ofShareholder Activism: A Survey ofEmpirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN.
405,411 (2017).
130 Alon Bray et al., How does Hedge FundActivism Reshape Corporate
Innovation?, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 1)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2409404.
131 See Nickolay Gantchev, Oleg Gredil & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Governance
under the Gun: Spillover Effects ofHedge Fund Activism 1 (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 562, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-2356544.
132 See Nickolay Gantchev, Merih Sevilir & Anil Shivdasani, Activism andEmpire
Building 1 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 575, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract-3062998.
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of long-term firm value, rather than from increased managerial
accountability." 133 Activism is also believed to have a perverse
deterrent effect on the long-term focus of the management, since it
distorts the ex-ante incentives of managers and other stakeholders to
invest optimally in the firm. 13 4 Moreover, activists are unlikely to have
superior knowledge, skills or expertise at running the business, as
compared to the firm's management.13 5 In addition, in favoring riskier
projects or an increase in financial leverage, hedge fund activism is
argued to increase corporate risk-taking and to heighten the risk of
wealth-transfers from creditors to shareholders.1 36 Finally, hedge fund
representation in the board of directors has been associated with an
increase in informed trading in the corporation's stock, suggesting that
activist board representation imposes new agency costs. 13 7
IV. RECONSIDERING INCENTIVE STRUCTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF
COLLECTIVE ENGAGEMENT
The previous analysis of institutional investors' incentive
structures implicitly relies on the assumption that investors conduct
their engagement initiatives individually. In fact, it is generally
assumed that institutional investors act in a solo-engagement context
where free riding problems and cost issues are particularly acute.
" Martijn Cremers et al., Activist Hedge Funds and the Corporation, 94WASH. U.
L. REV. 261, 262 (2016). See also Martijn Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M.
Sepe, & Ye Wang, Hedge Fund Activism, Firm Valuation and Stock Returns 1
(2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfn?abstract id=2693231; Ed deHaan, David Larcker & Charles McClure,
Long-Term Economic Consequences ofHedge Fund Activist Interventions
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 577, 2018),
https://ssm.com/abstract-3260095.
134 Creners et al., supra note 133, at 278; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The
Wolfat the Door: The Impact ofHedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance,
41 J. CORP. L. 545, 593, 605 (2016).
1s See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance
System, 126 YALE L. J. 1870, 1953-54 (2017). See also Bray et al., Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1755
(2008).
136 See April Klein & Emanuel Zur, The Impact ofHedge FundActivism on the
Target Firm's Existing Bondholders, 24 REv. FIN. STUD. 1735, 1735 (2011);
Sandeep Dahiya, Issam Hallak & Thomas Matthys, Targeted by an Activist Hedge
Fund, Do the Lenders Care? 5 (June 4, 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract=3191072.
But see Bray et al., supra note 135, at 1732.
137 See John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., Activist Directors andAgency Costs: What
Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board, 104 CORNELL L. REv. 381,
381-83 (2019).
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It is undeniable that some engagements may best be conducted
privately by a single-activist or non-activist-institutional
investor.13 8 However, there is a growing body of anecdotal evidence
and academic studies to suggest that coordinated engagements by
institutional investors are becoming increasingly widespread and can
have a positive impact on investee companies, especially with regard
to corporate governance issues.13 9
While wolf packs have received comparatively greater
consideration within the literature, increasing attention is being paid to
non-activist shareholders' collective engagement initiatives. For
example, according to Dimson et al., collective engagement initiatives
are "effective in successfully achieving the stated engagement goals
and subsequently improving target performance." 4 Doidge et al. note
that coordinated actions can help to overcome free-rider problems
affecting institutional investors.14 1 Similarly, Crane et al. maintain that
coordinated initiatives can improve institutional shareholders'
voice.142
However, while highlighting the potential benefits of shareholder
collective action, available empirical studies present some limitations.
First, the distinction between activist-driven and non-activist-driven
engagement is not always clear. Second, and more importantly, they
do not provide an unambiguous definition of shareholder cooperation.
Indeed, institutional investors can be associated with each other in a
number of ways, whether by informal or formal interconnectedness.
As noted by Enriques and Romano, co-ownership, geographical
proximity employee ties and formal connections such as membership
with investor associations can shape institutional investors' ownership
behavior with portfolio companies.14 3 Proxy advisors'" and hedge
138 See Elroy Dimson, Oguzhan Karakay & Xi Li, Coordinated Engagements 9
(Working Paper, October 24, 2018), https://ssrn.com/id=3209072.
139 See, e.g., id. at 27-28. See also Elroy Dimson, Oguzhan Karaka§ & Xi Li; Active
Ownership, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 12, 3240-42 (2015); Craig Doidge et al., Collective
Action and Governance Activism, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2019),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=2635662; Tanja Artiga
Gonzilez & Paul Calluzzo, Clustered Shareholder Activism, 27 CORP. GOVERN.
INT. REV. 210 (2019).
140 Dimson et al., supra note 138, at 1.
141 Doidge et al., supra note 139, at 25-28.
142 Alan D. Crane, Andrew Koch & S6bastien Michenaud, Institutional Investor
Cliques and Governance, 36 J. FIN. EcoN. (forthcoming June 22, 2017).
143 Enriques & Romano, supra note 109, at 24.
i" See Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds 3 (Apr.
16, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3124039).
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fund activists 145 can also act as informal connections among
institutions affecting their voting behavior. Although informal
connections among institutional investors can "contribute to shaping
institutional investors' incentives to vote 'actively,"' 146 formal
connections prove to be more relevant for supporting coordinated
engagement initiatives. Arguably, some kind of ex-ante formalized
cooperation is necessary to allow institutional investors to share costs
and help to overcome potential free-rider problems.1 47
Since this Article mainly points towards solutions that seek to
stimulate collective engagement initiatives by institutional investors,
we do not consider informal shareholder connections. We focus on
coordinated initiatives that imply the decision by participants to
engage alongside other institutional investors, in order to meet a shared
goal.
A. Activist-Driven Forms ofShareholder Cooperation
The distinction between activist-driven and non-activist-driven
engagements is sometimes blurred. To begin with, there appears to be
no clear distinction between so-called wolf packs and the different,
although equally activist-driven, phenomenon of the receptive teaming
up by non-activist institutional investors with an activist. Second, non-
activist-driven collective engagement comes in different shapes, such
as coordination by investor associations or investor forums. In this
Part, we provide an overview of these different forms of shareholder
collaboration with the aim of highlighting the fundamental differences,
thus laying the premises for a discussion both of the benefits of
collective engagements vis-A-vis activist, or activist-driven, types of
shareholder collaboration as well as their policy implications.
1. WolfPacks
The form of shareholder collaboration that relies on wolf pack
formation has been found to be "the most profitable type of
engagement, reflecting the high probability of achieving successful
outcomes."4 8 While it has been pointed to as an explanation.for the
145Gilson & Gordon, supra note 36, at 897.
146 Enriques & Romano, supra note 109, at 1. See also id. at 15, 22; Crane et al.,
supra note 142.
147 See infra, Part V.C.
148 Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge FundActivism: An International Study, 30
REv. FIN. STUD. 2933, 2936 (2017).
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recent spike in hedge fund activism,14 9 the wolf pack tactic has been
reported since at least 2005 as a form of pseudo-cooperation between
mutually supportive hedge funds "interested in the same prey but who
are careful not to form a Schedule 13D group."1 5 0 Avoiding formal
coordination between the members of the pack means preventing their
stakes from being aggregated under section 13(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act, followed by their notification as a joint stake, which
would trigger earlier disclosure obligations regarding potential
changes in corporate control, including the "purposes of the
transaction" and any plans or proposals involving material corporate
transactions relating to the issuer.'5 1
Based on parallel-though formally uncoordinated-action, the
wolf pack exploits the voting power held collectively by its members
to enable relatively small block-holders to gain significant influence,
thereby increasing the prospects of success of an activist campaign.1 5 2
Importantly, focusing on trading in the target's stocks around
individual 13D filings, the process by which the wolf pack is formed
involves a markedly speculative stance. Participation in the pack is
thus likely to be premised on trading-profits incentives. Such a
characterization of the wolf pack tactic holds despite some ambiguity
surrounding the particular mechanism by which wolf packs are formed
as well as the very definition of a wolf pack; in actual fact, two
competing views have been conceptualized in this regard, although
they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Some take the view that wolf packs are formed spontaneously as a
result of independent activity by their members based on investors'
understanding of the lead activist's playbook, as can be inferred from
its trading. It is considered that no direct communication between the
players need take place; reputational concerns are key in leading
smaller investors who compete for investor capital to purchase the
target's stockfollowing a 13D filing andtojointhe campaign triggered
by the larger, better-informed lead activist. 153 Mindful that a
.149 Coffee & Palia, supra note 134, at 549-50.
15Briggs, supra note 14, at 698.
i 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5 (b)(1) (2018) ("When two or more persons agree to act
together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of equity
securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired
beneficial ownership, for purposes of sections 13(d) and (g) of the Act, as of the
date of such agreement, of all equity securities of that issuer beneficially owned by
any such persons.").
152 See Alon Bray, Amil Dasgupta & Richmond Mathews, WolfPack Activism 2-3
(Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst. Fin., Working Paper No. 501/2017, 2018).
15 Id. at 4, 7 (finding an average abnormal turnover of over 20-40% per day over
the ten-day periodfollowing 13D flings).
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significant degree of participation in the campaign is necessary in
order for it to be successful, and that only a successful campaign will
increase the reputation of the institutions participating in the campaign,
small institutions are apparently motivated to join the lead activist
implicitly in order to increase their perceived skills and reputation, and
to attract additional capital inflow. 15 4 Admittedly, however, trading
profits resulting from private pre-filing tips from the lead activist may
increase followers' incentives to buy the target stock prior to the 13D
filing by the lead activist. Therefore, informed trading may
complement the spontaneous reputation-driven mechanism by which
the pack is formed.155
However, the data seems to more strongly support the view that
wolf packs are "a loose network of activist investors that act in a
parallel fashion but deliberately avoid forming a 'group' under section
13(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."156 Accordingly,
wolf packs are formed intentionally, and are motivated by low-risk
informed trading occurring prior to 13D filings. While buying up the
target's stock at lower prices until it reaches 5% threshold ownership
level, thus triggering the 13D filing obligation-and, usually, up to no
more than 10% during the following ten-day window set by section
13d(l) of the Exchange Act for the filing1 57-the lead activist is argued
to encourage other investors to join it by tipping them off about its
upcoming campaign prior to the filing in exchange for support.5 8
Circumventing the application of 13D group disclosures allows the
pack to accumulate fairly significant stakes in the target while
"escap[ing] old corporate defenses (most notably the poison pill) and.
. . reap[ing] high profits at seemingly low risk."'5 9 In effect, ungrouped
holders of stock in the target remain undetected for the purposes of
Regulation 13D, provided that no single investor participating in the
1
54 Id. at 5-6.
15 Id. at 29.
156 Coffee & Palia, supra note 134, at 562.
157 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a). See Coffee & Palia, supra note 134, at 563
(explaining that crossing the 10% threshold would subject the activist to section
16(B) of the Exchange Act, which "may force it to surrender any "short swing"
profit to the corporation on shares acquired in excess of 10%"). See also Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Alon Bray, Robert J. Jackson Jr. & Wei Jiang, Pre-Disclosure
Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5
(2013).
"I See Yu Ting Forester Wong, Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund
Activism, 2 and 4 (Colum. Bus. School Research Paper No. 16-11, Oct. 2,
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract-2721413 (conceptualizing the "coordinated effort"
hypothesis for wolf pack formation).
159 Coffee & Palia, supra note 134, at 549.
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coalition individually crosses the 5% ownership level, thus triggering
the 13D filing obligation.
The intentional nature of wolf pack formation is inferred from data
concerning trading volume and the appreciation of the stocks targeted
during the period of time close to the public announcement of the
campaign. Trading volume is found to increase abnormally prior to the
public announcement of the campaign and then to drop sharply
immediately after the 13D filing by the lead activist, with most of the
stock appreciation occurring during the ten-day window. 160 This
suggests that many other investors buy the target's stock during the
ten-day window. 161 The wolf pack members "most likely have been
informed by those filing the Schedule 13D of their intentions. The
inference then seems obvious: Tipping and informed trading appears
to characterize both the formation of the 'wolf pack' and transactions
during the window period preceding the filing of the Schedule 13D."1 6 2
In enlisting other investors in the formation of the pack by tipping them
off, the 13D-filing activist relies on the expected increase in stock
returns that usually follows the public announcement of the campaign
as a way of compensating them for their support. In effect, investors
"who learn of the incipient Schedule 13D filing face a nearly riskless
opportunity for profitable trading if they act quickly, as the Schedule
13D filing usually moves the market upwards."1 63
i.o See Coffee & Palia, supra note 134, at 564. See also Bebchuk et al., supra note
157, at 23 (finding that stock purchases by 13D-filer activist hedge funds are
"disproportionately concentrated on the day on which the investor crosses the five-
percent threshold and, to a lesser extent, the immediately following day").
161 Coffee & Palia, supra note 134, at 565. See also Choonsik Lee, Activism of
Blockholder Investors: Who Drives the Purchases of the Target Shares before
Schedule 13D Filing? 4-5 (Jan. 2015), http://www.fmaconferences.
org/Orlando/Papers/Activism ofBlockholderInvestors_2015FMA.pdf. But see
Alon Bray, J.B. Heaton & Jonathan Zandberg, Failed Anti-Activist Legislation: The
Curious Case of the Brokaw Act, 11 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 329, 345-47
(2018) (contending that activists' 13D filings often occur well before the ten-day
window closes, and that"the anomalous pattern of abnormal volume disappears ...
when trading data are centered on the date the reporting threshold is crossed rather
than the filing date." While not excluding that some tipping or wolf pack formation
may take place after the crossing of the 5% threshold, they note that the number of
additional shares purchased by the elusive pack is economically small . . .unless
much of the trading on the trigger date is by investors forming a wolf pack. It is
also likely that an important part of the trading on the threshold day is by investors
other than the hedge fund activist. Such trading can arise either because of leaked
information about the activist's intent to cross the 5% threshold or because activists
choose to trade precisely when they anticipate or observe uninformed selling).
162Coffee &Palia, supra note 134, at 565.
16Coffee & Palia, supra note 134, at 565.
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Further empirical research as found evidence that is consistent
with the notion that wolfpack formation is intentional. Specifically,
share turnover is found to be about 325% of the normal trading volume
on the day the 13D filer crosses the 5% threshold, whereby the bulk of
the trading volume is attributable to trades by investors other than the
lead activist.164 That finding ranks against the view that wolfpacks are
formed spontaneously, since synchronicity in block building by many
investors cannot be fully explained by any sudden changes in market
conditions. In addition, wolf packs are found to be more likely to occur
in better-defended companies: This, in turn, is consistent with'the
notion that wolf packs are used to circumvent securities takeover
defenses.165
2. Non-Activist Institutions Teaming Up with Activists
Having accepted that both the practice and the definition of wolf
packs are characterized by informed trading based on tipping, it is
necessary to consider another type of activist-driven uncoordinated
shareholder collaboration, which differs from that underlying wolf
packs. In effect, it is increasingly the case that-chiefly in the context
of proxy fightsl 66-actively managed mutual funds, pension funds,
and index investors share the views of an activist whom they consider
to be a credible actor,16 7 and are willing to support its campaign, either
privately or publicly, and to vote in line with it at the shareholders'
iId.; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jr. Jackson & Wei Jiang, Pre-Disclosure
Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 23
(2013).
16 See Yu Ting Forester Wong, Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund
Activism, 5 (Colum. Bus. Sch. Research Paper, No. 16-11, Oct. 2, 2016),
https://ssm.com/abstract-2721413 (finding wolfpack campaigns to be 6% more
likely to achieve at least part of the activist's objectives, and 9% more likely to
obtain board seats in the target; also, wolf packs are associated with an 8.3% higher
buy and hold abnormal return over the duration of the campaign).
166 See, e.g., Alon Bray et al., Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How
Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 7-8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.
(ECGI), Fin. Working Paper 601/2019, 2018),ssrn.com/abstract-=3101473
[https://perma.cc/LQ5J-U9EK].
167 See ACTIVIST INSIGHT & SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, THE ACTIVIST INSIGHT
ANNUAL REVIEW 2018, 6 (2018),
https://www.activistinsight.com/resources/reports/; See also C.N.V. Krishnan, et
al., The Second Wave ofHedge Fund Activism: The Importance ofReputation,
Clout, andExpertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 297 (2016) (pointing at reputation, clout
and expertise built up by top hedge funds as a consequence of being successful in
difficult interventions as factors further driving success).
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meeting. Ultimately, receptively teaming up with an activist "seems to
be developing into a broader market trend."'6 8
This form of shareholder collaboration is not restricted to activist
players alone or, at least, to actively managed funds motivated by
trading profits, but also involves passive investors. Since passively
managed investors can hardly be expected to be in a position that
allows them to exploit trading-either after or before 13D filings-
voting support provided by them to an activist's campaign cannot be
assumed to be motivated by the prospects of profits associated with
trading in the target's stocks during the period of time close to the
announcement of the campaign. It can hence be assumed that implicit,
spontaneous support by passive investors is provided on the basis of
pre-existing stakes held by them in the target. Institutions then decide
to vote in line with the activist at the target's shareholder meeting as a
result of the activist's ability to convince fellow shareholders of its
allegedly superior value-enhancing entrepreneurial views, as
compared to those of the target's management.169 Under the model of
shareholder collaboration considered here, there is no need for any
direct communication between the activist and its potential
followers.1 70 After building up its stake, the activist exerts pressure on
the target publicly, e.g. by means of open letters to the board of
directors and to all shareholders explaining its prospects in terms of
the changes advocated along with the reasons for those changes
whether regarding the firm's corporate governance, policies, strategy,
etc. Where the activist's views align with those of mainstream fellow
investors, the latter may decide to lend support to the campaign and to
back the activist's proposals, which obviously increases the likelihood
of success. In fact, the activist succeeds in its campaign "by coming
public, not so subtly suggesting a willingness to scuffle, and by
reaching an accommodation with the target's management that
168 Wolf-Georg Ringe, Shareholder Activism: A Renaissance, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORP. L. & GOVERNANCE 387,419 (2015).
169 See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, The Evolving Role ofInstitutional Investors in
Corporate Governance and Corporate Litigation, 61 VAND. L. REV. 299, 312
(2008); Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at 33-34. However, activist-driven teaming
up cannot be regarded as a functional substitute for non-activist collective
engagements. See supra Part IV.B. The former can only occur where the views of
mainstream institutions converge with those of the activist: which may happen
occasionally but is certainly not always the case. In fact, in line with the differing
business models and incentives structure characterizing different investor types,
their views often diverge. Therefore, institutions' teaming up with an activist may
be thought of as being complimentary to non-activist driven engagements.
'1 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at 40.
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involves the hedge fund gaining board seats"' 7-which often occurs
by means of a settlement concluded "well before the ballot box." 72
B. Different Forms ofNon-Activist Collective Engagements
Turning to non-activist-driven forms of collective shareholder
action, this Part provides an overview of the practice of non-activist
shareholder cooperation, taking account. of the recommendations
contained in stewardship codes aimed at promoting collective
engagement by institutional investors.
1. Collective Engagements in Stewardship Codes
Stewardship codes recommend that institutional investors
collaborate, where appropriate, on the grounds that (individual and)
collective engagement with portfolio companies is part and parcel of a
money manager's duty to act in the best interests of its clients, with a
view to maintaining and enhancing long-term value and "with the aim
of preserving or adding value to the clients' assets."l7 3
In Europe, a common reference to collective engagement is
contained in the*EFAMA Stewardship Code. In its current version,
EFAMA Principle 4 recommends that asset managers "should
consider acting with other investors, where appropriate." Emphasizing
that shareholder collaboration may sometimes be "the most effective
manner in which to engage," the Guidance to Principle 4 illustrates
that collective action with individual investee companies may in
particular be appropriate "at times of significant corporate or wider
economic stress, or when the risks posed threaten to destroy significant
value or the ability of the company to continue in operation." In
addition, the Code also welcomes ongoing collective engagements
concerning "policy issues."
As the very wording of Principle 4 makes clear, the EFAMA Code
heavily borrows from the 2012 version of the UK Stewardship Code,
Principle 5, of which it is re-stated almost verbatim by the EFAMA.
The proposed revisions to the UK Stewardship Code considered that
institutions' policies on collective engagement "should indicate their
readiness to work with other investors through formal and informal
groups when this is necessary to achieve their objectives and ensure
.i Strine, supra note 135, at 1902.
172 Strine, supra note 135, at 1904.
17 EFAMASTEWARDSHIP CODE 3 (2018); ICGN GSP, 5, https://www.icgn.org/.
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companies are aware of concerns," along with the circumstances under
which they would consider participating in collective engagement.17 4
Not surprisingly, given its precedence, the UK model for collective
stewardship has also inspired a number of similar initiatives at
Member State level. Examples include the 2018 Dutch Stewardship
Code, drafted by Eumedion, 7 5 which emphasizes the potential upsides
of shareholder cooperation and joint initiatives, noting that collective
discussion with investee companies may sometimes generate "a wider
and deeper range of analysis compared to a one-to-one meeting,"
especially where issues of common interest are concerned. It also
suggests that collective engagement may be beneficial to both investee
companies and investors, "because both the board and investors get
familiar with each other's views and perspectives and engagement is
made more cost effective."' 7 6 The cost consideration is thus explicitly
mentioned as a factor in favor of shareholder collaboration.
While also recommending that institutions' engagement policies
describe "how they will act collectively with other investors in order
to achieve greater effect and impact," the Danish Stewardship code
emphasizes that shareholder collaboration that does not occur in
relation to the acquisition of shares or other kinds of stake
accumulation in the relevant company is not at odds with the European
regulatory framework for takeover bids, including in particular the
provisions on concerted action.'77 Therefore, the Danish code suggests
that the rules on concerted action, specifically the risk of triggering a
174 See FIN. REP. COUNCIL, PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE -
ANNEX B - SUMMARY OF CHANGES FROM 2012 UK STEWARDSHIP CODE, Guidance
to Sec. 4, Provision 20, https://www.frc.org.uk/ consultation-list/2019/consulting-
on-a-revised-uk-stewardship-code [hereinafter: PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE UK
STEWARDSHIP CODE]. The updated UK Code 2020 states, in fact, that institutions,
"where necessary, participate in collaborative engagement o influence
issuers"-e.g., by "collaborating with other investors to engage an issuer to achieve
a specific change; or working as part of a coalition of wider stakeholders to engage
on a thematic issue." See UK Stewardship Code 2020, princ. 10.
175 Eumedion is an independent foundation, managed by representatives of
participants, representing the interests of Dutch and international institutional
investors in the field of corporate governance and sustainability performance; it is
currently participated in by about 60 institutional investors and umbrella
organizations collectively managing more than £5,000,000,000 in assets. See About
Eumedion, EUMEDION, https://www.eumedion.nl/en/abouteumedion.
176 EUMEDION, DUTCH STEWARDSHIP CODE 8-9(2018),
https://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/ best-practices/2018-07-
dutch-stewardship-code-fmal-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CSP-5CYR].
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mandatory bid, should not in principle discourage shareholder
collaboration or be used as an excuse to avoid collective engagement.
Closely following EFAMA, the Italian Stewardship Principles also
acknowledge that the collective one "may be the most effective
method of engagement." 17 Over the years, Assogestioni has been
increasingly taking on an active role in providing operational support
to its affiliates. 179 As has been shown by the Italian model, by
catalyzing investors' stewardship, investor associations can play an
active role within the framework for stewardship, and can turn into a
cost-saving vehicle for collective engagement.1 8 0
Similarly, the Global Stewardship Principles (hereinafter, GSP)
adopted by the Corporate Governance Network in 2016 acknowledge
the proactive role that can potentially be played by investor
associations. Guidance 4.5 to ICGN GSP 4 illustrates that investors
should "be prepared to form or join investor associations to promote
collective engagement," noting that the aim of collaborating with (both
domestic and overseas) investors is "to leverage the voice of minority
investors and exert influence, where required, with investee
companies." 181 Identical recommendations in relation to investor
associations are also set out in the guidance to Stewardship Principle
5 drafted by the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (hereinafter,
CCGG), 182 an organization formed and run by a wide range of
institutions investing in the Canadian capital market, which currently
includes pension funds, mutual funds and third party money managers
managing a total of almost four trillion dollars in assets. Finally,
collective engagement is mentioned as a beneficial tool also in the
Japanese Stewardship Code, revised in 2017, as well as the 2016
Singapore and Taiwan Codes, and the 2016 Hong Kong Stewardship
Principles.183
178 ASSOGESTIONI, ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR THEEXERCISE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AND VOTING RIGHTS IN LISTED COMPANIES 17-18 (2016),
https://ecgi.global/code/italian-stewardship-principles-2016 [https://
perma.cc/FPE5-CESY].
179 See generally Giovanni Strampelli, How to Enhance Directors'Independence at
Controlled Companies, 44 J. CORP. L. 103, 134-35 (2018).
180 See supra Part IV.B.3.
1I ICGN GSP, 17, https://www.icgn.org/.
182 See CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES 6
(2017), https://www.ccgg.ca/.
18 See THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: JAPAN'S STEWARDSHIP CODE 13 (2017);
SINGAPORE STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES WORKING GROUP, SINGAPORE
STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTORS 9 (2016); TAIWAN STOCK
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The relevance of collective engagement is clearly highlighted also
by the stewardship principles recently adopted in the United States.
Specifically, the investor-led Investor Stewardship Group (ISG)
provides a framework of basic investment stewardship (and corporate
governance) standards for U.S. institutional investor conduct, which
took effect on January 1, 2018. Principle F states that "[i]nstitutional
investors should work together, where appropriate, to encourage the
adoption and implementation of the Corporate Governance and
Stewardship Principles." 8 4 As the Guidance to that principle explains,
collaboration not only relates to institutions' efforts "to ensure that the
framework continues to represent their common views on corporate
governance best practices";18 5 it also, and more importantly, entails
"addressing common concerns related to corporate governance
practices, public policy and/or shareholder rights by participating, for
example, in discussions as members of industry organizations or
associations." 186 Here, too, the role of investor associations in
coordinating collective stewardship is explicitly acknowledged.
2. Investor Forums
Although stewardship principles and guidelines do sometimes
mention specific tools for collective engagement, such as coordination
EXCHANGE, STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 9 (2016);
HONG KONG SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION, PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE
OWNERSHIP 5 (2016). Stewardship Codes above are available at
https://ecgi.global/code/stewardship-principles-institutional-investors
[https://perma.cc/T336-CUTR].
184 See INV'R STEWARDSHIP GROUP, STEWARDSHIP FRAMEWORK FOR
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS Principle F (2019),
https://isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/ [https://perna.cc/X4DT-2GL7]
[hereinafter ISG PRINCIPLES]. The ISG, formed in January 2017, currently includes
"some of the largest U.S.-based institutional investors and global asset managers,
along with several of their international counterparts. The members include more
than 60 U.S. and international institutional investors with combined assets in
excess of US$31 trillion in the U.S. equity markets." About the Investor
Stewardship Group and the Frameworkfor US Stewardship and Governance,
INV'R STEWARDSHIP GROUP, https://isgframework.org/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
See also Hill, supra note 25, at 522-23 (noting that "ISG's new stewardship
principles are more tentative and ambiguous than the U.K. Stewardship Code", as
institutional investors' "collaboration appears to be directed at encouraging the
adoption and implementation of corporate governance/stewardship rinciples,
rather than engaging in collective activism per se").
185 ISG PRINCIPLES, supra note 184, at Principle F.1.
186Id. at Principle F.2.
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by investor associations,1 8 7 those principles and guidelines are not
prescriptive and feature a highly flexible approach. It is left to
investors to decide when and how, based on their differing investment
strategies and the interests they may share with other investors, it is
appropriate to exert active ownership collectively. As a consequence,
different pathways for collective engagement have developed.
In some countries, investor collaboration is supported by
organizations that specifically seek to facilitate coordination between
institutions when engaging with portfolio companies. One prominent
example is the UK Investor Forum, a "membership-funded not-for-
profit organization" which includes many UK and third-country
institutional investors." Following the explicit recommendations set
out in the UK equity markets review carried out by Professor John Kay
and promoted by the UK Government,189 the Investor Forum was
established in 2014 with the specific purpose of promoting collective
engagement by institutional investors.190 The Investor Forum has its
own team of corporate governance and financial experts.191 At present,
.there are forty-three institutional investors in the Investor Forum, of
which fourteen are international, accounting for around thirty percent
of FTSE All Share market capitalization.19 2 Between 2015 and 2018,
the Forum assessed forty-two collective engagement initiatives and
engaged with twenty-three companies. '1 In 2018, the range of
participants in collective engagement initiatives varied between six
187See supra notes 178-182 and accompanying text.
188See Purpose, INV'R F., (2019),
https://www.investorforum.org.uk/about/purpose/ [https://perma. cc/E8P4-VALN].
1 8 9 See JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM
DECISION MAKING 51-53 (2012),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
mentdata/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-fmal-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8AJG-3U4D] [hereinafter, KAY REVIEW]. Such recommendation
followed the one already made in Sir David Walker's corporate governance review.
See SIR DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS
AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2009),
https://webarchive.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker review
261109.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q4E-5J7R] [hereinafter, WALKER REVIEW].
190 ROGER M. BARKER & IRIs H.-Y. CHIU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 175 (2017).
191 See generally Team, INV'R F., https://www.investorforum.org.uk (last visited
Oct. 13, 2019).
192 INV'R F., REVIEW 2018 3 (2018), https://investorforum.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Annual Review 2018.pdf [hereinafter Inv'r F. Rev.].
93 Id. at 3.
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and twenty, representing company market capitalization of between
seven percent and twenty-two percent.194
In line with the recommendations of the Kay Review, the Investor
Forum takes a flexible approach.19 5 Crucially, collective engagements
occurring under the auspices of the Investor Forum must follow the
specific formal procedures outlined by the Forum in its collective
engagement framework, which was put in place inter alia "to prevent
inadvertent violation of legal or regulatory requirements" and, thus, to
reduce member institutions' disincentives to participate.1 96 According
to that framework, "[m]embers retain full voting and other investment
rights in respect of their shareholdings" and are free to "choose[] to
participate in an [e]ngagement involving a [c]ompany in which [they
are shareholders or] to opt out of an [e]ngagement at any time."1 97
Regarding the steps that must be followed within the procedures set
out by the Forum, both affiliated institutional investors and portfolio
companies can propose an engagement.'9 8 The Forum's Executive
evaluates the proposal and, once it has determined that the proposalis
consistent with the Forum's engagement framework, the team engages
in consultation with the major shareholders of the company to
determine the level of member support for the proposed
engagement.'99 The Forum then only proceeds with the engagement if
the proposal attracts an adequate level of support.2 0 0
Similarly, in Japan the Institutional Collective Engagement Forum
was established in 2017 as a response to recommendations concerning
collective engagement incorporated into the Japanese Stewardship
Code, according to which: "[I]n addition to institutional investors
engaging with investee companies independently, it would be
beneficial for them to engage with investee companies in collaboration
with other institutional investors (collective engagement) as
necessary."201
In line with the UK model, the Japanese Collective Engagement
Forum seeks to "help institutional investors conduct sound and
194Id.at7.
195 See KAY REVIEW, supra note 189, at 51.
1 9 6 INV'R F., COLLECTIVE ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK. SUMMARY 2 (2016),
https://www.investorforum. org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Collective-
Engagement-Framework-Summary.pdf [hereinafterINV'R F., FRAMEWORK]. See
also infra Part IV.C.
197 INV'R F., FRAMEWORK supra note 196 at 3.
198 Id at 5.
199 d
200 See id.
201 THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS ON THE STEWARDSHIP CODE, PRINCIPLES FOR
RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS: JAPAN'S STEWARDSHIP CODE 13 (2017).
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appropriate stewardship activities, especially in collective shareholder
engagements in which multiple institutional investors work together in
an aim to hold constructive dialogues with listed companies in
Japan." 202 To this end, "[t]he Forum will promote/organize
Institutional Investors Collective Engagement Program, which
coordinates collective engagement events and activities with listed
companies, in collaboration with multiple institutional investors."2 0 3
According to the Program, investors meet to discuss engagement
agendas before contacting the companies and form a common view
concerning each engagement agenda. The Forum, acting as a
coordinator, conveys participants' shared views to targeted companies
by sending summary letters, including the names of participating
institutions, with a view "to shar[ing] their awareness and
understanding of the issues the companies are facing"204 and inviting
comments from the companies concerned. In addition, the Forum asks
companies to set up meetings for face-to-face discussions where
needed in order to exchange views, and to facilitate dialogue by
moderating investor-issuer meetings. Since investors participating in
the Program are "those who conduct passive investment, such as index
investment,"20 5 the Forum is specifically aimed at supporting investors
that follow a "long-term, buy and hold investment strategy"206 andthat
may have weak incentives to engage. Hence, the Forum operates in
such a way as to reduce engagement-associated costs and to counter
any cost-related disincentives to active stewardship.
3. Associations Representing Institutional Investors
Efforts to support coordinated engagement are sometimes made by
institutional investor associations, with varying degrees of intensity
and in different forms-from providing member institutions with
forums for discussion, through to more organized coordination
initiatives, usually in relation to upcoming shareholder meetings.
Looser forms of support for shareholder collaboration may be
exemplified by the model provided by the CCGG. Despite not being
focused on collective engagements and not playing a role as
specialized as that of the UK and Japanese Forums, the CCGG offers
members the possibility to utilize the organization "to distribute
202 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS COLLECTIVE ENGAGEMENT FORUM,
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governance-related information to other Members, on the Hub, an
online discussion forum where Members can share their views on
governance issues and/or post links to relevant articles and
resources."207
Specifically regarding environmental, social and
governance issues, a tool similar to that provided by the CCGG is
available for signatories to the Principles for Responsible Investment,
a set of international principles drafted by a group of the world's
largest institutional investors, acting in partnership with the United
Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative and the United
Nations Global Compact. The PRI were launched in 2006 to encourage
the use of responsible investment to enhance returns and to better
manage risks; the initiative currently has more than 1,800 signatories
internationally. 208 The "Collaboration Platform" available to PRI
signatories is "a unique private forum that allows signatories to pool
resources, share information and enhance their influence on ESG
issues."2 0 9 The platform enables signatories, for instance, to send
invitations to sign joint letters to companies as well as to request for
support in relation to upcoming shareholder resolutions. In addition, it
also offers opportunities to join investor-company engagements
concerning particular ESG issues, alongside the support services
provided by the PRI.2 10 The PRI 2018 annual report states that 333
posts (7.4% up on 2017) and 282 shareholder resolutions (a 21%
increase on 2017) were added to the collaboration platform in 2018,
and that 22% of signatories had been active on the platform; 65% of
signatories reported having actively engaged with investee companies
via individual or collaborative engagements.2 1 1
More institutionalized support for collective engagement is
provided by some other investor associations. As mentioned above,
one such example is that provided by Assogestioni, the Italian non-
profit Investment Management Association, which represents most of
the Italian and foreign asset managers operating in Italy. The role
2 0 7 See CANADIAN COAL'N FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, BENEFITS OF MEMBERSHIP IN
THE CANADIAN COALITION FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE,
https://www.ccgg.ca/site/ccgg/assets/pdfibenefits-ofmembershipinccgg_-
thehub .pdf.
208 ABOUT THE PRI, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV.,
https://www.unpri.org/about-the-pri (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
209 pRI COLLABORATION PLATFORM, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INV.,
https://www.unpri.org/esg-issues/explore-the-pri-collaboration-platformn (last.
visited Oct. 17, 2019).
210 Id.
211Annual Report 2018, PRINCIPLES FOR REsP. INV., 13-14, (2018)
https://d8g8tl3e9vf2o.cloudfront.net/Uploads/g/f/c/priannualreport 605237.pdf.
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played by Assogestioni n collective engagement is closely intertwined
with the Italian regulatory framework for director elections at listed
companies, which is based on the so-called slate voting system. Based
on the mandatory adoption of that system, the Italian regime is
intended to ensure that at least one of the seats on the board is reserved
for minorities, provided that minority shareholders actually submit a
slate of nominees to be voted on at the shareholders' meeting.2 1 2
Minority shareholders are thus offered a way of gaining access to the
boardroom and obtaining a direct insight into the company's affairs.
The activation of this pathway requires a willingness to submit a slate
of director nominees to be voted on according to the applicable rules,
and to bear the (non-negligible) cost associated with this. Since the
introduction of this system, Assogestioni has played a central role in
selecting candidates and submitting minority slates.
In doing so, Assogestioni adopts a formalized procedure. In
particular, candidates are selected in accordance with the "principles
for the selection of candidates for corporate bodies of listed
companies" drawn up by the Assogestioni Corporate Governance
Committee, which is composed of members of the Association's
Board and representatives of member companies.213 Candidates for
election as minority representatives to the corporate bodies of investee
issuers are selected by the Investment Managers' Committee-which
212 See D.Lgs., 24 Feb. 1998, n. 58, Art. 147 (It.), available in English at
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-and-
regulations/documenti/english/laws/fr decree58_1998.htm (stating that
shareholders holding a minimum threshold of shares-set by the Italian
Supervisory Authority and currently varying between 0.5% and 4.50/-can present
lists of candidates for election to the board. At least one member must be elected
from the minority slate, having obtained the largest number of votes, and this
person must not be linked in any way, even indirectly, to the shareholders who
presented or voted on the list which received the largest number of votes).
According to Consob, the Italian Supervisory Authority, 96-out of 242-listed
companies' boards currently include at least one minority-appointed director. See
also COMMISSIONE NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETk E LA BORSA (CONSOB), REPORT ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES, 15 (2017),
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/report-on-corporate-
governance. Moreover, several bylaws, especially of larger corporations, have
actually made room for two or three minority-appointed directors, and the average
number of directors appointed by the minority is approximately two. Piergaetano
Marchetti et al., Disclosing Directors 7 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working
Paper No. 420/2018, 2018), https://ssm.com/ abstract=3264763.
213 See ASSOGESTIONI, PROTOCOL OF DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE AND THE INVESTMENT MANAGERS'
COMMITTEE 20-21 (2017), http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfin/
3,139,12309/protfunzccgcge dic_2017.pdf [hereinafter ASSOGESTIONI
PROTOCOL].
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is comprised solely of representatives of Italian or foreign institutional
investors-with the assistance of an independent advisor. This advisor
is charged with both maintaining a database of possible candidates and
submitting to the Investment Managers' Committee a shortlist of those
that appear to best meet with the requirements for each corporate
office.214 In addition, the selection principles drawn up by the
Assogestioni Corporate Governance Committee require that
candidates must have adequate professionalism, integrity, and
independence and, to avoid possible conflicts of interest, that the legal
representatives of investment management companies and-unless at
least one year has elapsed since the relevant appointments were
relinquished-anyone who has served in a senior management or
executive role in an investment management company may not be
selected as a candidate.2 15
In the Netherlands, Assogestioni's equivalent, Eumedion, also
seeks to facilitate cooperation amongst its members. The association
does so, amongst other things, by "encouraging joint consultations
between institutional investors, listed companies and their
representative organizations," and providing services in the field of
corporate governance to its members. 216 In particular, through its
Investment Committee, Eumedion plays a facilitating role for investor
collaboration with regard to upcoming shareholders meetings, in that
it:
[D]raws up a summary of the AGMs and sends this AGM
schedule to all Eumedion members; this schedule contains a
proposal stating which member(s) wish to attend a certain
AGM. The person going to an AGM makes a (preliminary)
analysis of the items on the agenda and forwards this to the
members. Members can decide on the basis of the AGM
schedule and analysis whether to give a proxy to the person
attending the AGM... If required, the person attending the
AGM can consult in advance on the items on the agenda for the
AGM with other members attending the AGM... A member
can decide on the basis of the analysis of the items on the
214 Id. at 25-26 (specifying that "[e]ven when minority slates are presented for
elections to boards, the Committee members undertake no obligation in regard to
the exercise of voting rights during general meetings.").
215 Id. at 28-29 (also stating that persons who hold a senior management or
executive role in investment management companies may not be selected as
candidates for company boards).




agenda for the AGM to give the person going to the AGM a
proxy to vote in favo[]r or against an item on the agenda,
depending on the discussion during the AGM.2 1 7
Thus, Eumedion provides a kind of "consultation platform" for its
members, although does not provide any analysis of its own
concerning the items on the agenda, or issue any voting
recommendation, and does not receive proxies or vote on behalf of its
members.2 1 8 As is also explained, the objective of the joining of forces
in the Eumedion investment committee is to enable "the exchange of
information in order to arrive at a stance with regard to subjects related
to corporate governance," and not to form a coalition to exercise
member voting rights at the shareholders meeting.2 1 9
Also, the U.S. Council of Institutional Investors (CII) sometimes
acts as "a facilitator of interactions among members and asset
management industry players." 220 Specifically, the CII hosts
occasional "engagement exchanges" where corporate and investor
members can meet one-on-one or in small groups to discuss particular
issues of concern.2 2 1 In addition, the CII annually publishes the "Focus
List" of underperforming companies with the aim of attracting
members' attention to such companies so as to "compel company
managers to step up efforts to improve performance."2 2 However, it
does not perform a coordinating function for affiliated investors





219 Id. at 51 (explaining that "[e]umedion members may naturally pursue the same
course of action because they share the same opinion, but this does not mean that
they are acting in concert.").
220 Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A
Network Theory Perspective 35 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No.
393/2018, 2018), https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/
working_papers/documents/finalenriquesromano.pdf
221 Investor-Company Engagement, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,
https://www.cii.org/engagement (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
222 Gary L. Caton et al., The Effectiveness ofInstitutional Activism, 57 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 21, 21 (2001); see also Andrew J. Ward et al., Under the spotlight:
Institutional investors andfirm responses to the Council ofInstitutional Investors'
Annual Focus List, 7 STRATEGIC ORG. 107, 107 (2009) (showing that "institutional
investors respond to this negative third-party signal by reducing their holdings in
firms that received this public repudiation" and that "targeted firms with more
independent boards respond by increasing the intensity of incentives of the CEO,
thus signalling their responsiveness to investor concerns.").
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similar to that of its foreign equivalent counterpart institutions.2 2 3 The
action encouraged by the publication of the Focus List does not require
consultation among investors, and usually does not result in collective
engagements by members.224
C. The Benefits ofNon-Activist Collective Engagements
While the impact of wolf pack activism on targeted firms has been
investigated in a number of studies, both theoretical and empirical, the
potential benefits of non-activist collective engagements are as yet
underexplored. 225 This part illustrates how different forms of non-
activist investors' cooperation can help to lower costs and make
engagement more effective and safer.
1. Cost Sharing and Limiting Collective Action Problems
Available empirical evidence-albeit still limited-consistently
shows that collective engagements are more successful than solo
initiatives. In fact, so the argument goes, coordination between several
institutional investors increases the potential influence engagement
activities "via louder voice and larger power."226 The pioneering study
by Gillan and Starks dealing with the corporate governance role'of
institutional investors shows that "proposals sponsored by institutions
or through coordinated activities receive significantly more favorable
votes than those sponsored independent individuals or religious
organizations."22 7 More recently, Doidge and others have found that
collective engagement initiatives promoted by the CCGG have a
notable rate of success. 228 Specifically, CCGG-led engagements
increase the likelihood that targeted investee companies will adopt
governance reforms (e.g. majority voting, say-on-pay advisory votes,
shareholder-aligned) requested by institutional investors.2 2 9 Along the
same lines, Dimson and others show that coordinated engagements
have a fairly high rate of success, especially when the investor leading
223 See Andrew F. Tuch, Proxy AdvisorInfluence, 99 B.U.L. REV. 1459, 1486-87
(2019).
224 Wei-Ling Song & Samuel H. Szewczyk, Does CoordinatedInstitutional
Investor Activism Reverse the Fortunes of Underperforming Firms?, 38 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 317, 318 (2003).
225 See supra Part IV.A.1.
226 Dison et al., supra note 138, at 9.
227 Gillan & Starks, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 277.
228 Doidge et al., supra note 139, at 14.
229 Id. at 20-24.
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the initiative is located in the same geographic region as the target firm.
230
While, of course, the greater likelihood of success of collective
engagements proves to be an effective incentive,2 3 1 it does not help to
exhaustively explain why institutional investors should be willing to
become involved in such initiatives. To clarify this point, it is essential
to consider how collective engagement initiatives can promote more
active conduct by institutional investors by favoring the redistribution
of the engagement costs among the institutional investors that carry
out engagement activities collectively,2 3 2 thereby increasing the net
return earned by each institutional investor involved.23 3 Moreover, in
doing so, collective engagement initiatives also lower the free-rider
problem that significantly contributes to the institutional investors'
"rationalreticence."234
Indeed, while according to conventional wisdom each investor
maximizes its wealth by declining to participate in collective initiatives
and by free riding on other investors' efforts,2 35 there is an apparent
economic incentive to join forces, irrespective of whether particular
investors might nonetheless prefer to free ride. Since fund managers
are remunerated by a fee that is usually a percentage (1%-2%) of the
assets under management, they are naturally interested in any actions
in relation to an investee company that is likely to increase the value
of assets under management, since this implies higher fees in monetary
terms.236
A simple example can help to reinforce the point. First, where an
engagement intervention is expected to result in an increase in the
returns of assets under management of $1,000,000 and implies costs
of $15,000, an investor charging a fee equal to 2% of assets under
230 Dimson et al., supra note 138, at 32.
231 Gonzalez & Calluzzo, supra note 139, at 212 (noting that "greater costs would
increase the incentive for activists to pool their resources through clustering").
23 2 See OECD, THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN PROMOTING GOOD
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 38 (2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081553.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RZD-9377] ("The ability for institutional investors to co-operate
is fundamental to resolving the free rider problems.").
233 Gonzdlez & Calluzzo, supra note 139, at 212.
234 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 36, at, 888-902; Kahan & Rock, supra note 35,
1048-57; Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance ofInstitutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 453-64 (1991). See also Paul Davies,
Shareholders in the UnitedKingdom 16 (Eur. Corp. Gov't Inst., Working Paper
No. 280/2015, 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2557680.
235 Davies, supra note 234, at 15-16.
236 Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at 4-5, 15-29.
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management will earn an additional fee of $20,000, and thus a net gain
of $5,000. While such initiative will be per se profitable even if it is
taken individually, profits would be higher for our investor if the same
initiative were to be carried out collectively. For example, if the
$15,000 costs were to be shared among (say) ten investors, ourinvestor
would earn a net profit of$18,500.237
Second, collective engagement may prompt investors to engage in
initiatives that would not be profitable if pursued individually. For
example, where engagement is expected to result in an increase of the
returns of assets under management of $1,000,000 and has a cost of $
30,000, an investor charging a fee equal to 2% of assets under
management would not engage, as it would suffer a net loss of
$10,000. Conversely, if the same initiative were to be carried out by a
number of investors-say ten-hat share the costs, it would become
profitable for our investor as it would earn a net profit of$17,000.
However, a coordinating entity is required in order to make the
collective engagement mechanism actually work.
First, a coordinating entity can reduce free-riding problems by
lowering the risk that engagement costs are borne by a limited number
of investors, while benefits are shared by all other investors who are
shareholders in the same investee company. For example, with the aim
of favoring the sharing of engagement-related benefits and costs
among investors, in order to allocate costs in proportion with the "size"
of associated asset managers, Assogestioni's bylaws state that each
member must pay a fee comprised of a fixed amount and a variable
amount, which is established by dividing the remaining portion of the
budget amongst all members in proportion with the assets collected
and/or managed at the end of the previous year.2 38 As is reported by
Doidge and others,23 9 the CCGG adopts a more complex cost-sharing
mechanism, which favors cost allocation among affiliated investors by
providing for increased fees in line with the size (in terms of assets
under management) of the institution, with a cap above a certain
237 Even if we assume that collective engagement comes with higher costs due to
the fee to be paid to the coordinating entity, a clear economic incentive to engage
collectively remains. Where, referred to the example in the text above, such fee is
$10,000-and overall engagement costs are $25,000-our investor would still earn
a net profit of $17,500.
238 See ASSOGESTIONI BYLAWS 34 (2016),
http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfm/3,813,11301/statuto-marzo-2016.pdf.
239 Doidge et al., supra note 139.
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threshold.24 0 Along the same lines, a similar solution is advanced by
Sharon Hannes, who argues that the crucial issue of the funding of
collective engagements coordinated by a specialized task force (called
"Super Hedge Fund") should follow a two-tier structure aimed at: (i)
placing the greatest burden on those that have invested in the specific
target company identified by the task force, based on a pro-rata
mechanism that takes account of the size of investors' holdings;241(ii)
sharing the lower tier-unrelated to specific engagement
initiatives-minimal funding serving the pre-engagement activities of
the task force among all investors involved in the task force. 242
If it is considered that "the most important factor by far in
determining how much a fund advisor stands to gain from being
informed is the size of the holdings,"243 cost-sharing mechanisms that
allocate costs among participating investors proportionately with the
size of their stakes could also help to alleviate another potential
disincentive against joining collective initiatives. In fact, where
engagement costs are allocated equally amongst participating
investors, irrespective of the size of their holdings, investors with an
overweighting of the shares of the target companies in their portfolio
will earn more than investors that have underweighted those shares in
their portfolio, and can hence improve their relative performance,
240 SeeCAN. COAL'N FORGOOD Gov. ANN. REP. 26 (2018),
https://www.ccgg.ca/annual-report/ ("Annual Member fees are based on total assets
under management (AUM). The annual fee for Members with total AUM below
$1.5 billion is $2,500. As total AUM increases above $1.5 billion, the fee escalates
on a straight-line basis by $1,500 for every $1 billion to a maximum annual fee of
$44,000. An affiliate of a Member paying the maximum annual fee of $44,000 is
eligible to become a Member for an annual fee of $2,500 irrespective of that
affiliate's total AUM.").
241 See Hannes, supra note 22, at 183. (noting that "[t]his capital call to the direct
investors of the target forges the link that is missing today between the institutional
long-term shareholders of the target of the activism and the agent that executes the
activism").
242 Id. at 182-83 (explaining that "[t]ier-one funding would be quite minimal and
used to support the task force before it engages in activism ... [h]owever, once the
task force begins to zero in on a target, it would become entitled to call for
additional and much more substantial tier-two funding ... to cover major possible
expenses such as proxy fight costs, litigation, and public and investors relations
campaigns. Most importantly, the source of funding for the two tiers would differ
as follows: the low-tier-one funding would be provided by all institutional investors
that have signed an agreement with the task force. [By contrast,] funding called for
after the task force has zeroed in on a target would ... be borne solely by the
institutional investors that invest in the specific potential corporate target and pro-
rata to their holdings in the-target." (footnotes omitted)).
243 Kahan & Rock, supra note 28,4-5, 20.
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attracting clients from other institutional investors.244 By contrast, a
size-related allocation of engagement costs among participating
investors can level out the relative performances of investors involved
in the collective initiatives, and therefore reduce stake size-related
disincentives.
Second, a third-party coordinating entity can facilitate the
circulation of information and agreement among institutional
investors.2 4 5 Such a facilitating role is especially important in order to
save costs and time when the investors involved in collective
initiatives have different geographic and cultural backgrounds. In fact,
absent such an entity, cooperation between investors would appear to
be ineffective and excessively expensive. In particular, without an
entity playing a coordinating role, "to achieve agreement among many
investors from diverse geographic and cultural backgrounds may
prolong the process. The delayed action may reduce the effectiveness
of engagements on issues that are timesensitive."2 4 6
2. Alleviating Regulatory Risks
The presence of a third-party coordinating entity can also helpto
reduce potential disincentives against joint collective engagement
initiatives posed by regulatory hurdles and also to lessen compliance
costs. 247 Although the chilling effect of regulatory hurdles on
collective engagement cannot be completely eliminated, there are
ways in which cross-jurisdictional regulatory concerns can be
effectively kept under control. Chiefly, a third-party entity taking on
an active coordination function (which function will be most
effectively performed where it is based on specific formal procedures
and safeguards) can work as an effective tool to reduce the risk of
concerted action, group formation, or the selective disclosure of
relevant information in breach of Regulation FD-or the Market
2" Id. at 23 (illustrating that since "it is relative performance, rather than absolute
performance, that affects fund flows ... attracting future fund flows generates no
incentives for a portfolio manager to cast an informed vote to increase the value of
stock in which a fund is underweight relative to competing funds or the
benchmark").
245 See Davies, supra note 234, at 16 (The coordinating entity could help investors
interested in joining collective initiatives to reach an agreement by creating
confidence that "costs of intervention will be spread across a number of
institutions.").
246 Dimson et al., supra note 138, at 11. See also Jean-Pascal Gond & Valeria Piani,
Enabling Institutional Investors' Collective Action: The Role of the Principlesfor
Responsible Investment Initiative, 52 BuS. & SOCIETY 64, 72 (2013).247 See infra Part V.A.
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Abuse Regulation in the EU.2 4 8 Indeed, practical experience with some
existing organizations seems to be encouraging.
The most illustrative example of this is UK Investor Forum, whose
framework for collective engagements was designed with a view to
prevent "inadvertent violation of legal or regulatory requirements"
imposed by multiple jurisdictions involved in cross-border investment
decisions.
As regards concerted action or group formation, the framework
requires members wishing to participate in an engagement o "agree
that they will not ... form a concert party in respect of the relevant
Company, including by requisitioning or threatening to requisition the
consideration of a board control-seeking proposal or seeking to obtain
control of the relevant Company, or otherwise form a group that could
trigger regulatory reporting or other regulatory requirements."249 To
that end, any engaging member will need to confirm its adherence to
the Forum's no-concert party and no-group undertaking, as well as its
code of conduct; additionally, the Forum's executives will carry out
appropriate monitoring to ensure consistency with the Forum's
principles and code of conduct, ask members to withdraw from an
engagement (or expel them if necessary) "if their behaviour
compromises the Forum's activities," and ensure liaison with the UK
Takeover Panel, seeking specialist advice whenever required.2 50
As far as inside information is concerned, the Forum is committed
to "actively seek to avoid obtaining inside information from
Companies and Members without its prior consent" and to "actively
seek to avoid passing on any inside information that it may receive to
Members without their prior consent," while also applying certain
procedures aimed at identifying and quarantining inside information,
where such information may possibly have been received or generated
by the Forum.2 5 '
In addition, since members are subjected to confidentiality
obligations during an engagement, communications between the
Forum's Executive and the members involved are based on a bilateral
model, and communication with the issuer is conducted by the
Forum's Executive itself, it is clear that coordination by the Forum (or
similar organizations) relies on the organization's leadership in
heading the dialogue as a means of avoiding direct action by member
248 For a similar view, see Dimson et al., supra note 138, at 10.




251 Id. at 3.
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institutions, as well as direct communications between participating
members and between companies and the engaging members.2 5 2 In
fact, to develop the engagement strategy, the Forum provides members
with a description of the range of views expressed by them with the
Executive, thus allowing mutual oversight by investors; however, the
Forum refrains from both exercising any advisory function and from
seeking "to form an agreement between Members, in particular in
relation to their investment or voting decisions."2 5 3
Overall, under a formalized model similar to that put forward by
the UK Investor Forum, the particular engagement follows a course
that ensures as far as possible that its strategy and outcomes cannot be
regarded, with hindsight, as being either premised on intentional, let
alone agreed, group formation or concerted action, or built on the
exploitation of inside information.
3. Enhancing Expertise
Collective initiatives involving a large number of investors can also
improve the effectiveness of the engagement "by borrowing expertise
from investors in the group who are more knowledgeable about an
issue or target company."2 5 4 This assumption is in line with empirical
evidence showing that, as far as ESG-related engagements promoted
by the PRI are concerned, success rates of collective initiatives are
increased by up to a quarter "when there is a lead investor who heads
the dialogue, especially when that investor is located in the same
geographic region as the targeted firm" and is therefore supposed to
have a superior knowledge of the local economic and regulatory
context.255
While, of course, even engagement initiatives coordinated by one
of the participating institutional investors that takes the lead within the
group of investors can prove to be successful, the facilitating role
played by a third-party coordinating entity seems to be crucial also in
this respect. First, absent such an entity, collective action problems can
prevent leading investors-which are theoretically capable of
enhancing the group's expertise-from undertaking collective
engagements. "While the lead investor bears a considerable costs
burden to gather the necessary information, potential benefits of the
252 Id. at 6.
253 Id.
254 Dimson et al., supra note 138, at 4.
255 Dimson et al., supra note 138, at 36.
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engagement efforts, such as improved firm performance and a higher
stock price, are shared among all stakeholders."256
In addition, although they are deemed to have adequate knowledge
and resources to perform a coordination function, even the biggest
international institutional investors-in terms of assets under
management-might not be able to provide case-specific expertise.
First, those leading actors may not add to expertise where the
engagement initiatives take place outside their country of origin as
they might not have adequate knowledge about the foreign regulatory
and business context or the investee company to which the engagement
relates. Given the considerable number of portfolio companies, the
stewardship teams at leading institutional investors are not capable of
dedicating the same degree of attention to all portfolio companies or
preparing detailed reports for each one.257 Second, the major
institutional investors, and especially passive investors holding stakes
in thousands of companies, draw up standardized voting guidelines
which they normally tend to follow fairly closely. Therefore, leading
investors are generally unwilling to go beyond their standardized
guidelines and to make significant investments in any company-
specific analyses that may be required by engagement in more
complex situations, such as proxy contests or M&A and related-party
transactions.258
Against this background, an adequately organized third-party
coordinating entity employing high-skilled professionals259 can play a
key role in providing institutional investors that intend to cooperate
with the necessary expertise. For example, such enabling institutions
can help to identify issues of interest to heterogeneous investors as well
as investors that may potentially be interested in joining the collective
engagement,2 60 or to develop an engagement strategy that meets with
the expectations of all investors concerned.26 Moreover, the third-
party coordinating entity can keep member institutional investors
informed concerning issues relevant to engagement. For example, the
CCGG aims to provide its members with updated information
256 Dimson et al., supra note 138, at 29.
257 See generally Strampelli, supra note 101, at 820. See also Bebchuk & Hirst,
supra note 72, at 31-35.
258 See e.g., Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note72, at 36.
259 For example, all members of the UK Investor Forum's teams have a strong
financial background and past working. experiences in the financial services and
investment sector. See Team, INV'R FORUM, https://www.invest
orforum.org.uk/about/meet-the-team/.
260 See Gond & Piani, supra note 246, at 72-73 (2013).
261 See INV'R FORUM, FRAMEWORK 6, supra note 196.
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concerning corporate governance developments by publishing a range
of materials-including best practice guidance, policies and
principles, and research studies-and hosting educational initiatives
on governance topics on a continuing basis.2 6 2 In addition, the CCGG
also provides members with a detailed analysis of the governance
practices of each listed company that is involved in the Coalition's
engagement program.26 3
In this respect, as the activity of the UK Investor Forum or the
CCGG indicates, it must be borne in mind that such institutions are
able to empower collective engagement initiatives by providing
expertise concerning relevant issues related to the engagement and
company-specific information as they manage a limited number of
engagements, usually concerning issues that go beyond the routine
matters usually covered by the voting and engagement policies
adopted by most of leading institutional investors. While such
investors engage with a huge number of investee companies,2 64 in the
first four years of its life the UK Investor Forum evaluated forty-two
UK company engagements and engaged in twenty-three engagement
initiatives.26 5 Similarly, the CCGG usually engages with the boards of
approximately forty-five to fifty companies every year.2 6 6 Therefore,
it is apparent hat such third-party coordinating entities will have more
skilled human resources to dedicate to each engagement and, in doing
so, can help to overcome problems posed by the small size of leading
institutional investors' investment stewardship teams.
Therefore, as one of us has already noted, coordinated engagement
cannot-and does not seek to-radically modify non-activist
institutional investor engagement practices. Arguably, third-party
enabling entities can help to promote more proactive engagement with
non-routine issues, such as proxy contests or M&A and related-party
262 2017 CANADIAN COAL'N FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, ANN. REP. 4,
https://www.ccgg.ca/annual-report.
263 Id. at 5.
26 For example, BlackRock-the world's largest asset manager-reports about 2,000
engagements in 2018, even though most engagements were qualified as "basic" and
generally amounted to one single conversation concerning a routine matter. See
BLACKROCK, INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP REPORT: 2018 VOTING AND
ENGAGEMENT REPORT 3 (2018),
https://www.blackiock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-voting-and-
engagment-statistics-annua 1-report-2018.pdf.
265 INV'R FORUM, REVIEw 3 (2018), https://www.investorforum.org.uk.
266 CANADIAN COAL'N FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2018),
https://www.ccgg.ca/annual-report/.
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transactions.2 6 7 By contrast, given also the size of existing enabling
entities, investors are likely to "continue to adopt standardized voting
policies and to rely largely on proxy advisory services for outine
matters."268
4. Reinforcing Reputational Incentives
Since it is widely acknowledged that reputational concerns can
prompt leading fund managers to play an active monitoring role over
their investee companies, 2 6 9 it must be also noted that collective
engagements are, to some extents, able to reinforce such a reputational
mechanism. In fact, it can plausibly be argued that institutional
investors could be incentivized to join collective initiatives where
these prove to be successful or to be viewed positively by end
clients.2 7 0
This intuition is backed up by the model designed by Bray and
others showing that "reputational rents can be achieved only by
participating in a successful activism campaign," while "[t]here are
never rents for remaining inactive, even when activism fais."271 In
addition, this line of reasoning is also supported by anecdotal
evidence. 272 In particular, although the benefits of collective
engagement for passive investors are, in theory, more limited due to
the presence of internal stewardship teams, as well as the fact that each
portfolio company has a lower relative weight, collective engagement
can also incentivize passive index fund managers to engage in costlier
engagement activities. For example, BlackRock carefully emphasizes
267 Strampelli, supra note 101, at 845. See also Davies, supra note 234, at 10
(arguing that "[n]on-routine intervention by shareholders in the management of
investee companies thus requires the construction of a coalition of institutions to be
effective").
268 Strampelli, supra note 101, at 845. See also Kahan & Rock, supra note 28, at
38; Hannes, supra note 22, at 179 (noting that, as for pension funds, "[t]hey do not
have to delve into the business activities of any single company in order to conduct
such activism... In other words, this is an inexpensive type of activism, and it
does not cost much to develop the agenda or manifest it, nor does it need to be
tailored to the business challenges and failures facing any single corporation"). But
see Tuch, supra note 223, at 1504 (contending that the empowerment of
coordinating entities aimed at promoting institutional investors' collective
initiatives could limit proxy advisors' influence in the United States).
269 See supra Part I.A.3.
270 See Hannes, supra note 22, at 189 (noting that "[i]nstitutional investors that
choose to opt out of a scheme that seems socially beneficial would suffer
reputational loss").
271 Bray et al., supra note 152, at 20.
272 Strampelli, supra note 101, at 848.
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in its proxy voting guidelines for European securities that "under the
umbrella of the Collective Engagement Framework of the Investor
Forum [BlackRock participates] in collaborative engagements with
other shareholders where concerns have been identified by a number
of investors."27 3
In addition, actions could be taken both by the coordinating entity
itself and by regulators to enhance the incentivizing power of
collective engagements.
First, as is suggested by Hannes, the coordinating entity could
stipulate that a minimal number of adhering investors is a necessary
condition for initiating engagement initiatives, thereby limiting the
potential chilling effect of conflicts of interest affecting institutional
investors that do significant business with investee companies, and
which are therefore not willing to gain a reputation for being
troublemakers.2 74 In fact, such an approach already characterizes the
operations of the UK Investor Forum, since the Forum only initiates
an engagement when there is the "reasonable prospect of securing
sufficient support among the company's largest shareholders."2 7 5
Second, the incentivizing role of collective engagement could be
further strengthened by the broader disclosure of collective
engagement initiatives. In particular, where a third-party entity acts as
the coordinator, it could disclose the identity of any institutional
investors that join each engagement initiative. Currently, coordinating
entities usually publish only a list of affiliated institutional investors,
without specifying the specific engagements of each member. Given
that some institutional investors would prefer to keep their
involvement in collective engagement initiatives confidential, a
flexible approach would be one under which the identity of the
investors involved in specific engagement initiatives would only be
disclosed with the consent of the investors themselves. Moreover, to
avoid any potential unintended consequences of such an enhanced
disclosure, the list of the investors joining a specific engagement
should only be published once the engagement initiative in question
has been concluded.
273 BLACKROCK, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES FOR EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN
AND AFRICAN SECURITIES 2 (2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-
us/investment-stewardship#principles-and-guidelines.
274 Hannes, supra note 22, at 187 (highlighting that such "provision would ease the
reputational concern of potentially conflicted institutional investors").
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In addition, to enhance the reputational incentive, as suggested in
the new version of the UK Stewardship Code, investors could be
required to disclose "what collaborative engagement hey have
participated in and why, including those undertaken directly or by
others on their behalf' and to provide additional information, including
"the issue(s) covered"; " the method or forum"; " their role and
contribution," as well as a description of the outcomes of collaborative
engagement, such as "any action or change(s) made by the issuer(s)";
"how outcomes of engagement have informed investment decisions
(buy, sell, hold)"; "whether their stated objectives have been met,"
including "instances where the desired outcome has not been achieved
or is yet to be achieved."2 76
V. IMPLICATIONS
As described in Part IV, one distinction that can be made in relation
to shareholder collaboration is whether collaboration is driven by
activist or non-activist institutions.
As they are promoted by activist shareholders that generate profit
by implementing major changes in their portfolio of public companies,
wolf packs clearly seek to gain control of corporate boards to influence
corporate decision making. Specifically, activist investors' purchases
of a large stake in a public company are often directly to "lobby the
company's management to implement changes that the investors
believe would increase shareholder value."277
On the other hand, stewardship codes, principles and guidelines
that offer guidance on how investors should exert active ownership and
interact with portfolio companies, explicitly make it clear that
"[e]ngagement by active and index-tracking investors differs from the
approach taken by activist investors who purchase large numbers of
shares in a company and may try to obtain seats on the company's
board with the goal of effecting a major change in the company."278
Based on the assumption that investments are focused on a horizon
longer than that which is usual for activists, stewardship codes
emphasize the view that traditional institutions-whether actively
managed or index-tracking funds-should conceive of engagement as
a tool for building constructive relationships with investee companies,
276 UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2020, princ. 10.
277 Carmen X. W. Lu, Unpacking WolfPacks, 125 YALE L. J. 773, 773 (2016).
278 EFAMA STEWARDSHIP CODE 3 (2018).
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based chiefly on mutual understanding. 279 Hence, investor
engagement is generally regarded as being premised on pre-existing
stakes and being focused on longer-term relationships with investee
companies. Therefore, the nature of an engagement-based form of
shareholder cooperation that is explicitly supported by virtually any
stewardship code is very different from that of wolf packs.
Accordingly, these different types of shareholder collaboration
should be kept distinct also as regards the applicable regulatory
framework. In particular, non-activist driven collective engagements
should not be reined in by the rules on group formation that are
relevant to blockholder disclosure requirements and the rules imposed
on inside information.
A. Smoothing the 13D Filing Obligation Hurdle
From the regulatory standpoint, the debate concerning wolf packs
largely focuses on the circumvention of 13D-filing obligations by wolf
pack members as a group. The rationale of blockholder disclosure
under section 13(d) is "focused on informing investors about
purchases of large blocks of shares acquired in a short period of time
by individuals [or groups] who could then influence or change control
of the issuing company." 2 8 0 In essence, 13D disclosures provide
investors with an early warning concerning potential shifts in corporate
control. Delaying disclosures by avoiding formal coordination while
exploiting tipping regarding an upcoming activist campaign may well
be lawful under both insider trading rules2 8.Iand Section 13(d)(3) of
the Exchange Act. However, wolf pack tactics could potentially
facilitate creeping control acquisitions. Moreover, trading on
asymmetric information over the ten-day window is regarded as
"com[ing] at the expense of selling shareholders," since it allows for
wealth transfers in favor of the activists.2 8 2 In general terms, the
passing of "material non-public information to a select few," which
279 Id. at 3-4. See also SirDavid Walker, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
UK BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS,
72 (2009), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/+/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker eview_261109.pdf.
280 Kristin Giglia, A Little Letter, A Big Difference: An Empirical Inquiry Into
Possible Misuse of Schedule 13G/13D Filings, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 105, 110
(2016); Hill, supra note 25, at 523.
281 See Strine, supra note 135, at, at 1897 (explaining that "so long as they are not
disclosing nonpublic information which they obtained as a result of an insider's
breach of duty, hedge funds are normally free to tip third parties about their own
plans or intentions-without running afoul of Rule 1Ob-5").
282 See Coffee & Palia, supra note 134, at 597 (2016).
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seems to be inherent in the wolf pack tactic, feeds a perception of
unfairness.2 83
By contrast, collective engagement by non-activist institutions
does not call for the same degree of regulatory concern as the
conscious parallelism of the wolf pack. In the first place, the very
notion of collective engagement-as conceived of within the context
of stewardship codes and principles-makes it clear that collective
action is not about seeking control or exerting decisive influence over
the firms' management, but basically about performing active
monitoring. Engagement-related coordination will not seek to bring
about major corporate changes, unless such changes result from a
"consensus process" with the issuer. That feature explains why, as a
rule, collective engagement levers pre-existing equity stakes in order
to develop longer-term foundational corporate relations. This is
particularly evident where passive index-tracking investors are
involved, who simply cannot trade their stocks unless changes in the
benchmark index occur. Consequently, since "any promising
involvement by shareholders will require more than acting in concert
for one vote,"284 stewardship is not meant to be occasional but implies
an ongoing activity aimed at disciplining corporate managers. By
contrast, coordinated activist intervention, such as that underlying wolf
packs, more easily falls into the category of what has been termed "an
ad hoc, one-period affair." 285
Furthermore, as experience with Assogestioni concerning
corporate elections in Italy shows,2 86 even where board representation
is sought, coordinated collective engagements do not depart from the
constructivist approach fostered by stewardship principles
internationally and are not aimed at gaining control of the board. The
number of nominees included in the lists of director nominees
submitted according to the procedure adopted by Assogestioni
283 Id. at 600.
284 See Manuel A. Utset, Disciplining Managers: Shareholder Cooperation in the
Shadow ofShareholder Competition, 44 EMORY L. J. 71, 76 (1995).
285Id
286 See Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership
Structure: An Empirical Analysis ofHedge Fund Activism in Italy and Germany,
andIts Evolution, 10 EUR. CO. &FIN. L. REv. 328, 371 (2013). See also Massimo
Belcredi et al., Board Elections and Shareholder Activism: The Italian Experiment,
in BOARDS AND SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED COMPANIES: FACTS,
CONTEXT AND POST-CRISIS REFORMS 414 (Massimo Belredi & Guido Ferrarini
eds., 2013); Luigi Zingales, Italy Leads in Protecting Minority Investors, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/357c40c4-094d-11dd-81bf-
0000779f2ac.
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corresponds to fewer than half of the seats on the board.2 87 In addition,
only nominees who meet with specified independence requirements
are included in the lists. 288 In keeping with the predominantly
monitoring role that is to be performed by minority-appointed
directors, director nominees are required to declare that, if elected, they
will act in full independence and exercise autonomous judgment in the
pursuit of the company's interests.289 This approach is very different
from that characterizing activist intervention,29 0 where hedge fund
executives are frequently appointed 291 and board representation
mostly serves as a toehold which can be exploited to promote, if not to
force through, wider-ranging objectives.292 Such objectives may be
"related to business strategies, balance sheet actions (such as returning
cash to shareholders through dividends or share repurchase) and
divestitures or other M&A actions (such as encouraging a sale of the
target company or opposing a merger) by target companies."293
All in all, engaging collectively does not in itself mean that the
collaborating shareholders are motivated by the purpose of bringing
about the effect, "of changing or influencing the control of the issuer"
(or a willingness to do so).294 Therefore, the collaborating investors
should not, in principle, be required to switch from a 13G to a 13D
filing and be treated as a group.295
287 ASSOGESTIONI PROTOCOL, supra note 213, at 25. See also Coffee & Palia, supra
note 134, at 560 n. 57 (noting that "[t]he goal of the short slate rule also was to
encourage 'constructive engagement' through minority board representation. .
288 ASSOGESTIONI PROTOCOL, supra note 213, at 28 (stating that appointed directors
"do not entertain and have not entertained, whether directly or indirectly,
relationships which may affect their independence of judgment with the company
for which they are nominated for a corporate office, or with the persons or entities
who nominate them, or with persons or entities related to said company or to the
nominators").
289 Id. at 29.
290 See Erede, supra note 286, at 370.
291 See generally Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance Is Made: The
Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649 (2016).
292 Coffee & Palia, supra note 134.
293 Sullivan & Cromwell, 2016 U.S. Shareholder Activism Review andAnalysis 15
(Nov. 28, 2016),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SCPublication_2016_U.S._Shar
eholder ActivismReview and Analysis.pdf.
294 See 17 C.F.R. §240.13d-1(b)(1)(i) (2017).
29 5 See Hill, supra note 25, at 523 (noting that some regulators "have attempted the
difficult task of differentiating between 'good' and 'bad' collective activism, with
the aim of encouraging the former and deterring the latter"). See e.g. AUSTL. SECS.




Yet, it cannot be denied that he current regulatory framework for
blockholder filings remains a roadblock that can thwart engagements
by non-activist investors. For example, as Bebchuk and Hirst point out,
to avoid taking on Schedule 13D filer status, the three leading passive
investors "refrain from communications about particular individuals
who they believe should be 'added to or removed from boards of
directors in the vast number of cases where one or more of the Big
Three had positions of five percent or more in portfolio companies."2 96
Uncertainty as regards the continuing eligibility to file
(individually or jointly) on Schedule 13G cannot be ruled out
completely within the context of collective engagement activities,
since the determination as to whether beneficial ownership of equity
securities has been acquired or is held for the purpose of or with the
effect of changing or influencing corporate control "is based upon all
the relevant facts and circumstances."29 7
Given that "a control purpose reflects the state of mind of a filing
person,"29 8 the SEC's view of the types of activity that could reveal a
controlling purpose is a broad one. Indeed, the Commission's
interpretations in this area are ambiguous and inconclusive; thus,
investors routinely filing on Schedule 13G may not without some
reason be wary that participating in a collective engagement could
result in the loss of their passive investor status.
In fact, regarding eligibility to use Schedule 13G under Exchange
Act Rule 13d-1(b) or 13d-l(c), the SEC has illustrated that "[t]he
subject matter of the shareholder's discussions with the issuer's
management may be dispositive in making this determination,
/media/3273670/rgl28-published-23-june-2015.pdf("[T]hereisadifference
between investors expressing views and promoting appropriate discipline in entity
decision making and investors effectively taking control of entity decision making.
Regulatory support for collective action by investors must recognise that the
takeover and substantial holding provisions place limits on cooperation between
investors to avoid control over an entity being acquired inappropriately.").
296 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 72, at 69. See also BLACKROCK, THE INVESTMENT
STEWARDSHIP ECOSYSTEM 5, 13, 17 (2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-investment-
stewardship-ecos ystem-july-2018.pdf ("BlackRock has never sought a seat on a
public company board as part of its stewardship activities."). .
297 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) and
Regulation 13D-G Beneficial Ownership Reporting, Compliance and Disclosure
Interpretations, Question 103.11 (July 14, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfm/guidance/regl3d-interp.htm [hereinafter
AMENDMENTS].
298 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, (1998), www.sec.gov./rules/fmal/34-39538.txt.
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although the context in which the discussions occur is also highly
relevant."2 99 According to the examples provided by the Commission,
Generally, engagement with an issuer's management on
executive compensation and social or public interest issues (such
as environmental policies), without more, would not preclude a
shareholder from filing on Schedule 13G so long as such
engagement is not undertaken with the purpose or effect of
changing or influencing control of the issuer and the shareholder
is otherwise eligible to file on Schedule 13G.3 00
In its adopting release, the SEC also stated that a shareholder's
proposal or soliciting activity relating to such topics would not
generally cause a loss of Schedule 13G eligibility. Moreover,
Engagement on corporate governance topics, such as removal of
staggered boards, majority voting standards in director elections,
and elimination of poison pill plans, without more, generally
would not disqualify an otherwise eligible shareholder from
filing on Schedule 13G if the discussion is being undertaken by
the shareholder as part of a broad effort to promote its view of
good corporate governance practices for all of its portfolio
companies, rather than to facilitate a specific change in control
in a particular company.3 0 1
On the contrary, "Schedule 13G would be unavailable if a shareholder
engages with the issuer's management on matters that specifically call
for the sale of the issuer to another company, the sale of a significant
amount of the issuer's assets, the restructuring of the issuer, or a
contested election of directors."302
As is apparent from the above, engaging with a company could
entail entering a grey area as regards the judgment over whether the
investors concerned are pursuing the goal ofchanging or influencing
corporate control. That is especially the case when putting forward or
supporting "proposals to sell or restructure the portfolio company, or
engaging with the portfolio company to propose or facilitate the
appointment of particular individuals as directors."303




303 See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 72, at 35.
199
OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Against this backdrop, it is quite clear that cost considerations
associated with the prospect of a possible switch from a 13G to a 13D
filing can discourage collective engagements. As has been
summarized in relation to the major index fund managers,
Schedule 13D filings must be made much more frequently than
Schedule 13G filings and are much more extensive. Schedule
13D must be filed within ten days after every acquisition and
subsequent change in holdings, compared to once-per-year for
Schedule 13G. Schedule 13D filings also require particularized
disclosure of each acquisition, entity-by-entity, compared to
disclosure of aggregated positions for Schedule 13G. Schedules
13D and 13G apply not just to the index funds managed by the
index fund manager but to all the investments they manage,
including active funds, and separate client accounts. This
increases the differential in compliance costs exponentially:
given the frequency of trades in all of these portfolios, making
the extensive disclosure for every single change in position that
Schedule 13D requires would be incredibly costly and time
consuming.304
13D filings not only restrict an investor's ability to trade following
the initial filing; they also "may cause the target firm to become hostile
to the blockholder and restrict access to management and thus a source
of information"; they are "typically accompanied by credit
downgrades. ... , higher bank loan spreads, and shorter bank loan
maturities"; finally, a 13D filing "signals that the blockholder believes
that the target is underperforming and intervention is warranted. Thus,
if she subsequently fails to intervene and firm performance does not
improve, she loses reputation among her own end investors."305 Those
additional effects of 13D disclosures are in sharp contrast with any
engagement-only intention that an investor might have. Still, U.S.
disclosure rules "are believed to chill concerted action by institutional
investors, making them wary to cooperate with their peers and engage
with portfolio companies."306
In addition, a chilling effect on institutions' willingness to
coordinate for engagement purposes may be further enhanced by the
3 Id. (pointing at the costs ofa switch to 13G filings as an incentive towards
deferential stewardship for index fund managers). See also Tuch supra note 223, at
1497-98.
305 Alex Edmans et al., The Effect ofLiquidity on Governance, 26 REV. FIN. STUD.
1443, 1449 (2013).
306 Tuch, supra note 223, at 1498.
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way in which U.S. courts have handled group disclosures, given that
"[c]onventional wisdom holds that courts are more willing than the
statutory language suggests to find that shareholders are acting as a
'group."'
3 0 7
If non-activist collective engagements are to be seriously
supported, legal concerns raised by the current legislation regarding
Schedule 13G eligibility should be removed by clarifying under which
conditions, as a general rule, collaboration between like-minded
investors exerting stewardship functions will not be associated with an
influence or control-seeking purpose, and will not trigger the
obligation to switch to 13D reporting.308
In designing a safer regime for collective engagement initiatives
promoted by non-activist investors that do not seek to gain influence
over the corporation's control, some insights can be drawn from the
European regulatory framework, where institutions that engage
collectively could be regarded as parties "acting in concert," thereby
the mandatory bid rule where their aggregate stakes exceed the
relevant threshold.3 0 9
Following calls concerning the importance of ensuring "that there
are no regulatory impediments, real or imagined, to the development
of effective dialogue" and the need to provide for a safe harbour for
collective engagements, 310 the European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA) has identified a "White List" of activities
shareholders may wish to engage in with a view to exercising good
corporate governance, but without seeking to acquire or exercise
control over the company. 311 Specifically, although "national
3 07 Id at 1497. See also Colleen D. Ball, Comment, Regulations 14A and 13D:
Impediments to Pension Fund Participation in Corporate Governance, 1991 Wis.
L. REV. 175, 176 (1991).
30 For a similar-but only sketched-proposal see Hannes, supra note 22, at 200,
203 (arguing that "the SEC should clarify that the indirect cooperation between
those who sign the agreement with the task force does not amount to holding their
securities together and that the member institutional investors would still be
considered passive investors").
3 09 See ROGERM. BARKER & IRIS H.-Y. CHIU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, 174 (2017). See also Davies, supra note 234, at 13-
14.
3 Walker, supra note 279, at 85-86. See FIN.CONDUCTAUTH.& FIN. REP.
COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 14 ("Firms ... need to be able to demonstrate to their
internal compliance functions that they are not 'acting in concert' when engaging
on a collective basis with a subset of the company's investors.").
311 EUR. SEC. & MARKETSAUTH., INFORMATION ON SHAREHOLDER COOPERATION
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competent authorities, when determining whether cooperating
shareholders are acting in concert, decide each case on the basis of its
own particular facts,"3 12 the ESMA states that "[w]hen shareholders
cooperate to engage in any activity included on the White List... that
cooperation, in and of itself will not lead to a conclusion that the
shareholders are acting in concert."313
The White List's activities include, among others, "making
representations to the company's board about company policies,
practices or particular actions that the company might consider taking"
and "agreeing to vote the same way on a particular resolution put to a
general meeting," such as proposals relating to directors' remuneration
or ESG issues.314 Moreover, even though it is not included in the White
List, the ESMA also provides guidance on shareholder cooperation in
relation to the appointment of board members. According to the
ESMA, when determining whether or not shareholder cooperation in
relation to board appointments will lead to the shareholders being
regarded as persons acting in concert, a number of factors must be
considered, including "the number of proposed board members being
voted for pursuant to a shareholders' voting agreement"; "whether the
shareholders have cooperated in relation to the appointment of board
members on more than one occasion"; "whether the appointment of
the proposed board member(s) will lead to a shift in the balance of
power on the board."3 15
In line with the ESMA's statement, the Italian experience with
minority-appointed directors clearly suggests that, under an explicit
model for formal coordination led by third-party organizations and
involving the adoption of adequate procedures and safeguards,
investors seeking to appoint some non-executive independent directors
on the board as a lever by which to improve corporate governance
should not be considered to be control-seeking. As mentioned above,
when managing the submission of short slates for the appointments of
independent directors, Assogestioni relies on formalized procedures
which enhance the active management role that is to be played by the
312 EUR. SEC. & MARKETS AUTH., INFORMATION ON SHAREHOLDER COOPERATION
AND ACTING IN CONCERT UNDER THE TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE 4 (2019),
https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/information-shareholder-cooperation-and-
acting-in-concert-under-takeover-bids-directive-0.
" Id. See also Davies, supra note 234, at 14 ("Simply proposing or supporting
change of executive directors (or of managerial policy) does not necessarily
amount to board control, in the absence of evidence of a wish to exert continuing
control of the board.").
314 EUR. SEC. & MARKETS AUTH., supra note 312, at 5.
31 Id. at 7.
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association's internal committees throughout the process while
keeping member institutional investors in a fundamentally reception-
only position.316 Thus, the Italian case is of particular interest since it
shows that-despite the rules on acting in concert set at the EU-level,
which are particularly attentive to board elections involving a possible
aggregation of the stakes of those acting in concert, which may trigger
a mandatory bid--collective engagements nonetheless may very well
disassociate itself from any control-seeking intent and instead remain
within the limits of active monitoring and stewardship.
Hence, several lessons can be learned from the European
experience. First, it confirms that there is no clear-cut solution for
avoiding 13D-related concerns for institutional investors.3 17 Second,
based on the ESMA's approach, the SEC could adopt a similar view
to provide a safe harbor for collective engagement initiatives that do
not seek to gain control of the company.3 18 In particular, the SEC
should consider providing a white list of engagement-related
activities that, in themselves, are considered to fall beyond the scope
of section 13D, unless it is demonstrated on the basis of a case-specific
analysis of all relevant circumstances that such activities have control-
seeking purposes.
B. Limiting the Risk ofRegulation FD Infringements
As mentioned above,319 one further potential hurdle for investor
engagement with portfolio companies is associated with Regulation
FD, which concerns the selective disclosure of material non-public
31 See supra Part IV Section B.3.
31 7Namely, a clear-cut solution based on the distinction between activist and non-
activist institutional investors aimed at excluding the latter from the scope of 13D
disclosures is not advisable, since there appears to be a not negligible tendency of
some non-activist institutional investors to adopt activist tactics that are more likely
to have an influence over the control ofinvestee companies. See, e.g., Justin Baer
& Dawn Lim, Mutual Fund Managers Try a New Role: Activist Investor, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/ mutualfundmanagerstryanewroleactivistinvestorl1546174800. See
also LAZARD'S SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY GROUP, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVIsM-1Q 2019, 12-13 (2019), https://www.lazard.com/
perspective/lazards-quarterly-review-of-sharebolder-activism-ql-2019/ (reporting
e.g. that "Wellington Management switched its 13G filing to a 13D and publicly
opposed Bristol-Myers Squibb's $74bn acquisition of Celgene").
3 1For a similar view: See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 72, at 92 (suggesting that
U.S. "[p]olicy makers should facilitate such pooling by making it clear that the
shared use of such resources would not create a group for the purposes of Section
13(d)").
319 See supra Part. IV Section C.2.
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information to certain specified persons.3 20 Specifically, any dialogues
between an issuer and selected investors occurring within the
engagement process could possibly (either inadvertently or not) result
in the selective communication of price-sensitive information, such as
advance warnings of earnings results, before such information is
disclosed to the public. Since shareholders are explicitly- included
within its scope, Regulation FD has an impact on board-shareholder
engagement.321 In particular, due to the obligation to not trade on
material non-public information, institutional investors deploying
active investment strategies might be disincentivized to engage
directly with portfolio companies.
However, concerns related to Regulation FD within the context of
engagement should be largely scaled down.3 2 2 First, investors are
unlikely to discuss topics that are more likely to be classified as
material. In fact, investors are mostly concerned with issues-such as
"succession planning, executive compensation, director nominating
criteria, governance philosophies, and general board oversight
(including of accounting, internal controls, risk, auditing and other
related matters)"323-that do not usually fall within the scope of Reg
FD.3 2 4 Second, advance arrangements are usually made to ensure that
investors do not receive any material non-public information through
320 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2017).
321 See Joseph W. Yockey, On the Role and Regulation ofPrivate Negotiations in
Governance, 61 S.C. L. REV. 171, 206 (2009).
322 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 821, 834-836 (2013); Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the
Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849, 871, 898 (2012); Eugene Soltes,
What Can Managers Privately Disclose to Investors, 36 YALE J. REG. BULLETIN
148, 149 (2018). See also BusINEss ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 25-26 (2016), http://businessroundtable.org/corporate-govemance.
323 See THE SHAREHOLDER-DIRECTOR EXCHANGE, INTRODUCTION AND SDX
PROTOCOL 19 (2014), http://www.sdxprotocol.com/what-is-the-sdx-protocol/.
324 See Fairfax, supra note 322, at 836 (citing STEPHEN DAVIS & STEPHEN ALOGNA,
MILLSTEIN CENTER FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE, TALKING
GOVERNANCE: BOARD-SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS ON EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 10 (2008)). According to the SEC, material information mostly
concerns topics such as earnings information; mergers, acquisitions, tender offers,
joint ventures, or changes in assets; new products or discoveries, or developments
regarding customers or suppliers; changes in control or in management; change in
auditors or auditor notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an auditor's
audit report; events regarding the issuer's securities; and bankruptcies or
receiverships. See SEC, Written Statement Concerning Regulation Fair Disclosure
(May 17,2001), www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051701wssec.htrn#P7817603.
204 [Vol. 14:2
2020] INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR COLLECTIVE ENGAGEMENTS
contact with directors, so as to avoid trading prohibitions under insider
trading law. 3 2 5
That said, it is worth noting that regulatory risks associated with
board-shareholder dialogue are minimized to a greater extent within a
context of collective engagement. Arguably, if various investors are
involved jointly in the dialogue, cross-control among investors could
help to reduce the likelihood of infringing Regulation FD, since the
disclosure of material nonpublic information during contacts with the
company would limit the ability of all participating investors to trade
in the company's securities. Moreover, as the above-mentioned
example of the UK Investor Forum clearly shows,3 2 6 this is especially
the case where a third-party entity takes on the coordination of
collective engagements and adopts formalized procedures capable of
substantially preventing investors from receiving of material non-
public information.
C. Recognizing the Facilitator Role ofa Coordinating Entity
Coordinated engagements by traditional asset managers may occur
in different ways. As has been shown above, the relevant factor
common to any such form of intervention is the enabling role played
by a representative third-party entity.327
Support provided by such entities can be categorized based on
whether the action carried out by the organization is light-touch or
more significantly institutionalized. While some such organizations
provide for loose forms of support to members, but do not themselves
take on a truly active stance (as is the case, for instance, with those that
merely run platforms enabling the investors to exchange views
concerning specific portfolio companies), other entities operate as real
drivers of engagement. These organizations proactively stimulate
collective action by performing a propositional and monitoring
function concerning the initiation, management and overview of
325 See F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: The Casefor Significant
Shareholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(June 24, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-
the-case-for-significant-shareholder-engagement/ ("[L]arge shareholders are not
looking for inside information on strategy or future expectations. What they're
looking for is the chance to provide the perspective of a long-term investor.
Companies individually have to decide how to best manage that risk, but it
shouldn't be by shutting out the shareholders completely."). With reference to the
European context, see UK Stewardship Code 2012 at 7.
326 See supra, Part IV Section C.2.
327 See supra Part IV. Section B.
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specified engagement initiatives within a formalized procedural
framework. In some cases, they also perform a scouting function to
select director nominees regarding whom members could potentially
arrive at a consensus. Of course, other arrangements fall between the
two extremes.
To a greater or lesser extent, all forms of support provided by third-
party entities facilitate and promote collective engagement as they
reduce institutional investors' costs and enhance their aggregate voice,
ultimately fostering management accountability. In general terms, the
enabling effect of such entities results from their very operation, which
may consist of:
triggering the initiative for collective action; . . . [providing for]
mobilizing structures that allow potentially interested investors
to network and to identify partners in engaging the collective
action; . . . [reducing] incentives to free ride in engaging the
reputation of investors . . . ; and . .. providing a monitoring
context and an administrative structure that bear a significant
amount of the coordination cost.3 28
However, it seems to be apparent that this enabling effect is likely
to depend on the extent to which the deployment of collective
initiatives follows specific procedural patterns outlined and monitored
by the organization and is proactively supported by it. For collective
action by traditional asset managers and asset owners to be effectively
subsidized, organizations hould both adopt a more active role in
supporting the engagement process and also take the procedural steps
required to create an organizational structure and context that is
capable of effectively fostering and supporting the engagement
initiatives within a formalized framework.
The adoption of formalized safeguards and procedures not only
enhances the enabling effect of third-party organizations with regard
to collective engagements. Even more crucially, an enhanced degree
of formalization within the engagement process allows third-party
entities to perform a truly facilitating function: the procedures adopted
can, in fact, effectively counteract he regulatory disincentives against
collective action described above. Organizations that ctively perform
328 Jean-Pascal Gond & Valeria Piani, Organizing the Collective Action of
Institutional Investors: Three Case Studiesfrom the Principlesfor Responsible
Investment Initiative, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS' POWER TO CHANGE
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 19, 53 (Young & Gates ed.,
2014), https://doi.org/10.1108/S2043-9059000 05010.
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a coordination function based on specified procedures and safeguards
can provide a safer environment that reduces the risk that any investors
wishing to participate in a collective engagement initiative may be
viewed as seeking to influence the company's management, thus
becoming subject to heightened regulatory requirements, including the
filing of a long-form Schedule 13G instead of a short-form Schedule
13G.
Constraints on shareholder collaboration imposed by 13D
disclosures are considered to account as an explanation for the
comparatively limited role played by trade groups, such as investor
associations, in fostering collective engagements in the United
States.329 However, a complementary explanation for this limited role
of trade groups may be found in the fact that the existing U.S.
organizations do not yet appear to have embraced the proactive,
organized approach adopted by certain entities such as the UK Investor
Forum in Europe. The more third-party organizations act as a filter
between the investors and the company with which they engage, the
more they require members participating in an engagement initiative
to comply with requirements and procedures set out in advance, and
the more they perform a monitoring function over the process and the
conduct of participating members, the greater the degree of assurance
they will provide. As a result, investors wishing to take part in a
collective initiative may reasonably do so without breaching the
relevant provisions and being exposed to the related consequences.
Indeed, as mentioned above, the drafting of a framework for collective
engagements by the UK Investor Forum specifically took account of
the need to prevent "inadvertent violation of legal or regulatory
requirements" imposed by multiple jurisdictions involved in cross-
border investment decisions.330
If third-party coordinating entities are believed to actually promote
the more effective involvement of institutions with portfolio
companies, investors should be encouraged to participate in such
entities. To this end, the SEC should explicitly recognize the role of
those coordinating entities in promoting collective engagement
initiatives in line with the applicable regulatory framework.
Therefore, in designing safe harbors for collective engagements
that do not seek to influence or control investee companies,331 the SEC
should accept that-unless a control-seeking purpose can be inferred
from the relevant circumstances of the case-collective engagement
329 Tuch, supra note 223, at 1498.
330 See supra Part. IV.B.2.
331 See supra Part V.A.
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will not be relevant under Section 13D where the institutional investors
participating in the initiative have explicitly committed not to form a
control-seeking group and have appointed a third party to monitor
compliance with the agreement according to predefined frameworks
governing the process of engagement and establishing rules of conduct
for participating investors.
In addition, to enhance the regulatory relevance of coordinating
entities by limiting conflicts of interests and distorting incentives, the
SEC or, perhaps, stewardship principles could recommend that, where
the engagement process is managed and overseen by the facilitating
entity and not by the investors themselves (as is advisable in order to
minimize the risk of forming a group), independence requirements
could apply to the coordinating entity's executives who actually lead
the initiative. This would be particularly advisable if some executives
of the coordinating entity are former representatives of the institutions
participating in the engagement or potential target companies. For
example, it could be stipulated that a member of the coordinating
entity's team should avoid participating in engagement initiatives
involving any investors with whom she/he has had business relations
during the previous twelve months. Such additional requirements
would reasonably promote independent monitoring throughout the
collective engagement process.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Looking beyond hedge-fund wolf packs and activist-driven teaming
up, this Article sets out the first comprehensive analytical framework
for non-activist shareholder cooperation, showing that coordinated
engagement by non-activist institutions can be a promising lever by
which to foster a more effective and viable corporate governance role
for non-activist institutional investors and provide an alternative to
activist-driven ownership involvement.
After considering the diverging incentives structures of activist and
non-activist investors and showing how they are reshaped within a
context in which investors collaborate in the engagement process, this
Article illustrates that non-activist driven collective engagements are
beneficial in several respects. First, collective engagement favors the
redistribution of engagement costs and, therefore, increases the net
return earned by each institutional investor involved. In doing so, it
also lowers the free-rider problem generally affecting institutional
shareholders' behavior. Second, the presence of a third-party entity
that coordinates the engagement initiatives can work as an effective
tool for reducing potential regulatory risks, mainly concerning 13D
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group disclosures and Regulation FD. Third, collective engagements
can exploit the expertise of more skilled investors who participate in
the initiative or of the third-party coordinating entity. Finally,
collective engagement initiatives can enhance reputational incentives
for being active owners, as institutional investors may be incentivized
to join collective initiatives where these prove to be successful or are
viewed positively by end clients.
Against this background, this Article concludes that, to promote
non-activist stewardship as an actual alternative to activist-driven
share ownership, collective engagement initiatives should be
incentivized by clarifying the remaining grey areas within the relevant
regulatory framework. In particular, there is the need for the SEC to
provide greater clarity concerning the circumstances in which
collective engagement through an enabling organization will not, as a
rule, be regarded as control-seeking or concerted action and will not
trigger group filing obligations under Section 13D ofthe Securities and
Exchange Act. In addition, the SEC should explicitly recognize the
role of such coordinating entities-that adopt predefined frameworks
governing the process of engagement and establish rules of conduct
for participating investors-in promoting collective engagement
initiatives in line with the applicable regulatory framework. Thus, the
CII or similar institutions could play a more significant role in
promoting effective institutional investor stewardship, following the
patterns of counterparty institutions in other countries.
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